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I. Introduction 
· A. Raison d •'9tre 
In view of the very recent political, social and economic 
developments in Bolivia, this author has deemed it timely and appro-
priate, if not absolutely essential, to look at the situation existing 
there with a little more than superficial curiosity. He believes this 
is essential, not solely because what is happening to this hapless 
Latin American country may subsequently spread t? the oth~r Latin Re-
publics in this hemisphere, but primarily because the mineral richness 
of Bolivia may very well represent a veritable storehouse of strategic 
minerals that could spell the difference between the survival and the 
destruction of the United States in the struggle against the Communist 
avalanche that threatens to engulf the world. 
The author has long been aware of the varying degrees of 
animosity existing in every single one of the twenty Latin. American 
Republics toward the ncolossus of the North"; however, like other 
citizens of the United States brought up in the "American way of life11 , 
he has never questioned the commercial or foreign policies of his 
government in its dealing with the La tin American States, nor has he 
attempted to uproot the causes of the anti-American sentiment harbored 
by our neighbors to the south. Instead he has gone along with his 
fellew-Americans believing implicitly that What is good for the United 
States must necessarily be good for all the Western Hemisphere, and 
that these queer Latin Americans with their idiosyncrasies and petty 
jealousies "just don't understand the United States." 
g 
-B. The Problem 
This study attempts to bring into sharp focus several recorded 
historical events that could be construed or interpreted as being acts 
of "economic aggression" on the part of the United States, and which 
may, or may not substantiate the distrust of our southern neighbors. 
'these events will be brought up in this thesis to serve not as an in-
dictment of the American people, because the writer believes that the 
average American is innocent as well as ignorant of what is transpiring 
in La tiri America, but rather, as a criticism of our blundering La tin 
American policy -- a type of "ad hoc" policy which has been character-
ized by "deals11 fostered and promoted by selfish, mercenary groups and 
other vested interests. 
The writer respectfully submits that in view of the elevated 
place which we have taken among the great powers of the world, and of 
the responsible role that we must therefore assume in shaping the destiny 
of mankind, we must of necessity recognize our past mistakes as such; 
we must raise our heads out of the sand and face realities; and finally, 
we must awake to the fact that what takes place in Latin America is, or 
should be, very much the concern of the United States. 
It is the further belief of the author that we can no longer 
ignore this vast area with its 11nlimited material and human resources. 
It must be borne in mind that the twenty Latin American countries form 
the largest group among the sixty members of the United Nations. It is 
no less startling to realize that one hundred and fifty-five million 
Latin .Americans comprise a huge human reserve, and that the rate of 
population growth among them is significantly high. 
• 
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Furthermore, the writer sincerely believes that ther~ is still 
time to initiate an enlightened, understanding, and consistent policy 
in Latin America that may in a large measure atone for our past blunders, 
and at the same time, help to eradicate the feelings of resentment and 
distrust which the peoples of the other Americas have for us. He be-
lieves that our adoption of such a policy is imperative not only because 
it would do much to promote free enterprise and freer trade among the 
free nations of the world, but mainly because of the insidious plot 
against democracy, liberty, and respect for human rights which has been 
set in m0tion in Latin America. This movement would refute the history 
of an expansive area "Which like the United States, was conceived in 
freedom. 
An interested and constructive attitude on the part of the 
United States toward the La tin American countries would do much to help 
them put their respective countries in order and to establish relative 
stability of government. Such a policy precludes ~ political inter-
ference and should be in harmony with the countries' economic and 
social reforms. And last, but not least, such a policy would include 
educating the American foreign investor to be cognizant of the economic 
and social problems existing in the country in 'Which he wishes to in-
vest. Intelligent and understanding actions on the part of the inves-
tors would hasten the creation of that intangible "favorable invest-
ment climate.u It is safe to say that such a climate can be brought 
about only through the mutual cooperation of the foreign country and 
the investor. 
C. Sources of Material 
The information presented in this study was obtained primarily 
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from periodicals, as well as from books and government sources as 
cited. In considering the material presented, it would be well to 
bear certain facts in mind. There is no central agency collecting 
facts and figures on the economies of the Latin .American countries in 
all of their aspects. Statistics, therefore, are scattered, sometimes 
out of date, and come from a wide variety of sources, and consequently 
may not appear in clear outline. Much searching, very often unsuccess-
ful, is required to obtain a modicl.liil of essential materials. Every 
effort has been made to maintain accuracy, to make logical interpreta-. 
tie:ns and to keep on an o bj ecti ve plane. The writer is fully a-ware of 
the fact that every man is a product of his own prejudices, and that 
alth0ugh he may try t0 maintain intellectual impartiality, interpreta-
tions may still come out with an unintentional bias. 
· D. Scope of Study 
Obviously in a survey of this si3e it has been impossible to 
discuss every phase of the topic and admittedly there are limitations. 
This study purports to delineate two specific events in which it is be-
lieved the United States played a particular role for better or f0r 
worse. These events ..rere: 1. The Catavi Mine Massacre of 1942; z. 
The Revolution of 1951. 
In order to set a proper frame of reference, and to facili-
tate a more accurate analysis of these events, the introductory part of 
the study will be comprised of three sections; the first section will 
deal with a general description of Bolivia; the second will be a mono-
logue on tin; and the third will treat Bolivia as a source of ti1!1.. In-
asmuch as the political, economic, and social aspects involved are so 
ll 
,.' .· 
irrevocably integrated that to try to isolate one er the other would be 
folly, the writer has done the inevitable 'Which is to weave them all 
into a composite. 
The author regrets that he has never been in ~olivia, which 
fact further limits the usefulness of this study since all of the ma-
.terial was derived from secondary sources such as liprary research. 
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II. Bolivia, a Topographic Synthesis 
It has been said that in a reasonable world, Bolivia could 
not exist. The location of her cities and of two-thirds of her popula-
tion upon an arid and infertile plateau more than 12,000 feet above sea 
level, staggers the logic. Tradi tionall:y, the mountains have been 
hostile to mankind While plains have generally been hospitable. Yet, 
Bolivian civilization is cradled in the most formidable of the Andes 
mountains. 
A. Geographical Background 
Bolivia, a nation with an area of 420,000 square miles, is 
completely landlocked, not only because she is politically bounded b.r 
five countries, Brazil t~ the north and east, Paraguay to the south and 
east, Argentina to the south, and Chile and Peru to the west; but be-
cause the small nucleus of pragmatic national territory which in fact 
forms the geographical center of Bolivia, is effectively w.lled in 
from the coast by major physical barriers.# These barriers segr~~ting 
"' 
the vario11s clusters of Bolivian people from the Pacific Ocean are 
titanic ranges and peaks which reach altitudes of eighteen to twenty 
thousand feet, windscoured and treeless plateaus, and a desert which is 
reputedly the driest in the world. The most unusual fact about Bolivia 
obviously is not that it is approximately one-third mountainous and two-
thirds lowlands, but rather that most of the Bolivians live in the moun-
tainous third of the country, leaving the lowland two-thirds as an in-
effective and thinly populated area. 
#See Chart A. 
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CHART -A. 
PHYStOGRAAi lC 
D~VIS IONS OF 
BOLIVIA 
UJ 
I ~· _J 
I. 
~~ u 
ALTIPLANO 
~ I a t/OR/11[/U'{ AL7JPLANO 
~ I b NOR7HE.f3N AND£5 M1S. 
I, 5DUTfffRN 11 LTJPLANO 
Topographically as well as alimatically, Bolivia can be di-
vided into three main divisions; the Altiplano, or literally the high 
level; the Yungas; and the Llanos of the east. 
1. The Altiplano 
The highlands of Bolivia located at a point Where the high-
lands of the Andes reach their greatest span, are made up of three dis-
tinct parts; the Western Cordillera, a number of very high intermontane 
basins, marked Qy deep gorges, coarse bunohgrass, and geological detri-
tus, known oolleoti vely as the altiplano; and the Eastern Cordillera. 
The northern half of the Altiplano is the fortunate recipient of enough 
moisture for subsistence agriculture, but the southern half gets prog-
ressively drier in a southerly direction and culminates in a string of 
salt flats and the A taoama desert. ·The climate in this region is de-
termined more by the altitude than by the latitude. Therefore, despite 
the nearness of the equator, the tropical heat is neutralized by the 
high elevation, so that the plateau is cold and depressingly desolate 
in the winter, and oool in the summer. It can be seen that for agri-
cultural and pastoral purposes, ·the suitability of the western part of 
Bolivia diminishes from northeast to southeast as the aridity is ag-
gravated. Most of the inhabitants of the Altiplano live in the nor-
thern basins along the line of demaroa tion between the very wet north-
east and the very dry south and southeast.* 
The least unfavorable location on the Altiplano with respect 
to habitability, is that area around Lake Titicaca known as the Titioapa 
*6, P• 1.78-179 
Basin. The surface of this large, fresh water, navigable lake is 
12,507 feet above the level of the sea, yet its approximate depth of 
900 feet is su:ff':I,.cient to keep the temperature of' the water relatively 
constant throughout the year at about fifty-one degrees Fahrenheit. 
TJais effects a moderation of the.air temperature around the lake at 
night and during the winter, which in turn makes possible the ripening 
of maize, Wheat, and barley even at 5UOh extreme altitude. 
This phenomenon represents a cemparative advantage to a 
people whose livelihood is entirely dependent on subsistence agricul-
ture and the shores of Lake Titioaca have throughout recorded history 
maintained a relatively dense population. It is believed that this 
region of concentrated settlement was the home of a very ancient_civili-
zation whose ruins may still be seen on the islands and along the 
shores of' the lake. The inhabitants of this region, most of them In-
dians, had always been so closely. a ttaohed to the land as a result of 
centuries of agricultural pursuits, that the Spanish conquest had 
little or no effect on them •. Even today, the BoliVian government has 
been unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade the Indians to change 
* from their communal system to oae of. private property. 
The Ti tioaoa highland Indians are interested only in support-
ing themselves with their meagre crops of barley and potatoes, and 
their homely but useful domestic animal, the llama. Transporting their 
surplus products to international and to other domestic markets has no 
more significance to them than does the fact that the Ti tioaca Basin 
~~ p. 180 
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lies on both sides of the Peruvian-Bolivian political boun~. This 
utter indifference for man-made divisions eleque~tly illustrates the 
inability of the Spanish to impose their civilization on that of the 
Indian. One gets the feeling that if the civilization of the 'White 
man should suddenly disappear, the civilizatien of the Indian would re-
main unaltered. 
2. The Yun.gas 
This region has been accurately <iesoribed as picturesque 
mountain valleys leading like gigantic -steps dgwn from the Cordillera. 
Climatically the most ideally located region in Solivia, the Yungas, 
sometimes called the montaiia, is a series of slopes and valleys at an 
average altitude of 6,000 feet. The region has abundant rainfall and 
a mild temperature in sharp contrast to the Altiplano, and is therefore 
ideal for semi-trepical agriculture. Latifundia, however, is preva-
lent, the larger estates having-as many as a half million acres or 
more.* Part of the land en these esta tee is worked by the Indians 
under the supervision of an overseer;· a. system not disimil.ar to that 
of the plantation of the ante bell1l1m southern United States. Farming 
is the onl'Y' occupation in the Yungas but it is oondu.cted in a very 
primitive and inefficient way. There is little demand in the local 
markets for most farm products, consequently most of the crultivatien 
is devoted to growing coca leaves for 'Which there is ample demand am0ng 
the Indians and Oholos.# The coca shr\lb is g-re>wn in terraces on th.e 
*18, P• 173 
#Persons of mixed blood, especially Indian and Spanish 
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mountain sides. Since the leaves are· a source of· cocaine, some of the 
leaves are exported to be used ·in the extraction of the drug 1 but the 
greater part remain in the country to be consumed by the Indians and 
ChoJ..os. 
3. The Lla.n.Els 
This region of lowlands includes more than half the area of 
Boll via and extends from the Brazilian boundary te , the 'herders of Para-
guay and Argentina. This huge area ranges in appearance and vegetati0n 
from thick, humid tropical forests in the north, rolling grasslands in 
the central ~®rtiom, and dry country, covered with scrub in the south. 
As has been stated before, .this- sectiGn is very sparsely popu-
la ted and it ha~ only two cities of a.D:3" impG>rtance, Trinidad and Santa 
Cruz. It has rich resources of frui:t,-:illab.ogany, coffee, cotton, rubber, 
I 
and cattle, not to mention petroleum, and in the future, may devel0p 
into a d.istriet of greater importance than at present. Its paramount 
problem is the same one that plagues and separates the other concentra-
tiona of population. There are :few roads and these are in such poor 
condition tba t it may take . a truck up to fifteen days to make a . trip 
from Santa Gruz to Ooahaba.mea, a distanqe of about three hundred miles.# 
.; ~ 
B. Bolivian Demegrapby 
Until ver,y recently, the population figures for Bolivia were 
anybody• s guess.* And these guesses, discreetly_ called estimates, 
varied by as much as two million.· Owing, inter alia, to the lack of 
#Coohabamba is the railroad outlet to the west. 
*15, P• 251 
J..S 
transportation and communication, it has been exceedingly difficult to 
conduct a reliable census covering all of Bolivia, particularly, the 
rural districts. However, in September 1951, an efficial census ws 
held and the results have recently been :made public. The figures show 
that Belivia now has .3,019,0.31 people, or a full three-quarters of a 
million less than the official estimate made in 1947. Many writers 
disagree with the results of the . latest census, and some go as far as to 
say that it is off by as much as a million. 
Due to the unreliability,ef pepulatio:a statistics and te an 
aokm.owledged high infant morta.l.it;y J;ate,# some of the earlier writers 
tended to describe Bolivia~s population as being stagnant.* This theory 
has been disputed by a United Nations Mission, 'Wb.ioh estimated that the 
.population had increased by 685,000 between 19.37 and 1948. Thus repre-
senting an average increase of population for the period of approxima-
tely 1.7 per cent a year.** 
1. Racial Characteristics 
There is as great a divergence of opinien as .to the racial 
make-up .of the Bolivian nati0n a.e ·there is on total population figures. 
But the greater number of geographers agree that the proportion of pure 
Indians is from 50 to 60 per cent of. the total, ·while· the mixed or 
Oholo graup is fram 25 to .30 per cent. These two groups taken to-
gether amount to abeut 90 per. cent, ·the remaining 10 per cent being 
comprised mostly of slightly mixed persons·. of European descent together 
with a comparatively few completely unmixed Eur0peans.*** 
#The mortality rate is 400 per mille. 
*9, P• 21 
**14@, p. 11.3 
***6, P• .175 
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2. The Highland Indians 
The pure Indian group· is ·predominantly Quechua and Aymara. 
. ~ 
The Qu.echliB.S are direct descendants of the Incas while the Aymaras are 
believed to ante-date even the Incas. Though they form the largest 
population bleo in Bolivia, the Indians are ne lCi>nger the proud race 
of pre-colonial days. 0n the c0ntrary, they are :now a repressed and 
downtrodden majority. The Bolivian writer, Alcid.es Arguedas, has 
called them 11A Sick People. fi# Practioa:Uy all of them are uneducated, 
and speak only their own dialects.. Since there is no· official busi-
ness carried on, and no official education, other than in Spanish, they 
are automatically barred from the schools and lt;Lwcourts. In other 
words, theirs is typically a role of strict passivity. It is reported 
that even today, when land. is bought and sold on the altiplan0, the 
n'W!lber of Indians living or "squatting" on it is of prime considera-
tien with regard to the price the land will connnand on the market. 
This is so because they traditionally have gone with the land and have 
been obligated to submit to their nmaster" a certain number of days of 
. * labor annually f0r their right te tenancy. ,The Indians cannot vote, 
for suffrage ·in Balivia is restricted to those who .can read and write. 
Therefore, elections are run and the government operated by a minority 
of approximately 100,000 voters, ·or to·put it more significantly, one 
person out of every thirty-five. 
The life the Indian populati0n. leads em the· high, barren 
plateau is miserable to say the, least •. ·Certainly there are some farms 
that could· be termed prosperous by: stretching the i.:ma.gination, but 
#One ef his books is entitled Pueblo Enfermo, meaning, A Sick People. 
*98, p. 1.8 
these are the extreme exception. 
The typical InQ.ian hut or "chozan is thatched with bun.cbgrass. 
It has dirt floors, no ~dows, and the Indian and his domesticated ani-
mals commonly :Live t0gether. -Few, indeed, are the villages wealthy e-
nough to have toilets or any other . kind of sanitary facilities. As a 
consequence, smallpox and other communicable diseases are not uncommon, 
and dysentery is endemic. 
In a region where the altitude varies between twelve and fif-
teen thousand feet above sea level, where· temp~rature fluctuates frGm 
the lew 50's during the day to below freezing at night, it would seem 
logical if not absolutely indispensable.for human habitations to be 
heated. Bu.t the Altiplano Indian is not so fortunate. His only sources 
of fuel are dried llama dung and what little wood he can ma.ster. And 
these must be hoarded for cooking purposes. It llillSt be borne· in mind 
that it takes a long time to even boil water at 13,000 feet. 
Unless he is a mine laeorer, the Bolivian Indian generally 
raises what he eats, basically barley, okra, peas, quinoa, and potatoes. 
The potatoes are amall and scrawny in comparison to the North Ameriaan 
potatoes, and the Indian. submits them to a peculiar process of alter-
nate freezing and. thawing l!tntil . they are reduced to lut!lps of almost 
pure -starch. The ul.timate prG>duct is called nchunon, and is the staple 
* of the Indian diet. 
The reader will probably be asking himself the obvious ques-
ti0Il. Why does the Altiplano Indian contiaue to .struggle for survival 
on so inhospitable a plateau? 'Why deesnrt he migrate te the eastern.· 
*18, P• 161 
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-, 
part of BoliVia, where the-population is sparse, the climate mild, and 
the soil fertile? 
To answer these- questions adequately, the writer submits the 
following quotation:* 
It is no surprise to find that to the Bolivian aberigine, 
"land is the very breath of life.'' ·If he holds it as free 
property, it is his 11pearl,of greatest price." So dear is it 
to him that, in time of famine,· he will sell his child rather 
than part with his diminutive· parcel of. ground. He fences 
it with a wall of stones or mud. He carefully guards the 
boulders that mark,·its bounds. He leeks upon every traveler 
with a suspicious eye for fear the stranger may covet his 
tiny heldings. If, as is usually the case, the land belongs 
not to an individual, but to a group of persons who hold it 
collectively, it iS' no;'less &ear.· Every member of the body 
is per se a defender of its holdings. No greater perfiey . 
Can be C€>mmi tted than to violate or fail to support the an-
·cient custom of guarding the common holdings. 
The ·Indians not only love their land; they cling to it 
generation after generation. Most of the families have 
lived on their present holdings from time immemorial. No-
thing will induce them. to move. There is far more fertile 
soil in the valleys east of the cordillera. A milder 
climate may be found in the valleys· which the Indian traders 
visit from time to time. But these facts do not entice 
them. to abandon· the lands upon 'Which their father lived. 
Even the inducement of good wages in the cities, at the 
mindes, or upon the railroads can seldom uproot these. de-
voted farmers from their little plots of ground. Even if, 
as often happens, the land be absorbed b.r an adjoining 
hacienda, and passed repeatedly from one ow.oer to another, 
the Indian remains on it, being transferred with the soil. 
Only by the use of violence and by the demolition of-his 
humble cottage, the destruction of his sheep corral, and 
. the appropriation. of his fields, can he be driven from the 
, place. Centuries of eccupation have fixed him to the soil. 
0. Political History 
It is· improbable that a:n:y other sovereign nation. in the, 
world has had so tempestuous and so turbulent a political history as 
*57, p. 300 
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has Bolivia. During her history of independent nationhood extending 
a little over a century and a quarter, Bolivia has had 179 revolu-
tiona, or an average of one every :mine months. During this period 
there have been some sixty presidents, and governments have counted 
their terms of ten'IU'e in months or weeks rather than in years. Just 
in the last decade there have been eight presidents and nine revolu-
tions. Such a record would seem ·to indicate that there llli1St be some 
intricate pattern of forces which underlies this political restless-
ness. To better understand these.forces it is desirable to outline 
briefly the p01itical history of Bolivia since her independence. 
1. Bolivian Independence 
As a Spanish colony Bolivia -was a oompesi te of 'Wba t used to 
be the vice-royalty of Peru and the Intendencia of La Pa.:z:. La Paz was 
the capital of the northern part, and Chlllquisaca, now the city of Su.ore, 
-was the capital of the southern part. 
In January of 1812, the independence of Upper Peru was de-
clared by General Sucre, and in A-ugust 0f the following year, Chuquisaca 
ratified the declaration. 
. I / 
That same year, Sim6n Bolivar drew up the 
boundaries Which gave Bolivia the sea coast that it later lost to Chile 
..... 
as a result 0£ the War of the Pacif'ie, fought during the years 1879 to 
1884. 
2. First Consti tutio:m. 
I 
In May of 1826, Bellvar gave to the co1mtry named after him, 
its first constitution. It was a d0o'UJilent 'Which he himself had drawn 
up, and "Which was adopted vi tlil practicaJ.ly :rae amendments. It was a pe-
culiar constitution judged b,y modern standards, inasmuch as it tended 
2.3 
to give the central gevernment .almost absollll.te control. However, :Boll-
var had purposely designed it thus because he was skeptical of the abi-
lity of the Creole/ to conduct natienal affairs strictly by representa-
tive means. He believed firmly that an intermediate stage between the 
status of a col0ny and that 0f a republic was necessary, and he correct-
ly forecasted continuous trouble if the people of the new, independent 
states insisted on having a true democracy rather than his type of a 
monocratic state. The Constitution of 1826 therefore decreed that the 
president's tenure of office should be for life, and that strong powers 
should be concentrated in his hands.* In a sense, the president would 
be almost a dictater. And in addition to having the right to appoint 
his own vice-president and cabb.et he als0 had the right to name his 
successor, thus making possible the creation of a perpetual dynasty. 
Aocmrding to Bolivar's constitution, the legislative branch 
of the government was to consist of three houses: a House of Tribunes, 
'Who would have jl!lrisdiotion over fiscal, military, and foreign affairs; 
a Rouse of Senators, that would have autherity over the judicial, ecole-
siasticaJ., and constitutional matters, and 'Whose members woUld alse 
hold office for life; and a House of Censors that would have broad 
pewers regarding the culture, moral habits, customs, and 'Who would care 
for the civic health.* In fairness to BoJ.ivar it must be pointed out 
that his primary concern was not dictatorship. Rather, he was concerned 
with the pessibili~ that a state of anarchy might result if', because 
of lack of experience in seJ.f-govermnent, demogogues might assume ccm-
*16, PP• 292-293. 
#Persons of Spanish descent born in the colonies. 
trol. of the government. 
General. SUcre was elected as the first president of Bolivia 
in recognition of his heroism in the 'WS.r of independence. However, 
he did not prove to be a satisfactory executive, and hence was forced 
to resign on August 2, 1.828. 
3. Confederation of Pen and Bolivia 
General. Santa Cruz, a Peruvian and descendant of the Inoas · 
got control. of Bolivia early in 1829, fol.l.owing the assassination of 
General $acre's successor, General. Blanco. Under Santa Cruz's leader-
ship>, the Censtitutien was revised in 1831. reducillg the President's 
life tenure, and otherwise considerably liberalizing the erigimal. char-
ter. Santa Cruz, however, did not stay in Bolivia, but instead went 
back t0 Peru where he remained llD.tiJ. 1.836·. His prolonged absence in-
evitably epened the way to widespread anarchy in Bolivia. Santa Cruz 
then proceeded to unite Peru and Bolivia under a single rule by means 
of a Oenfederatien that was given its constitution in 1.837. 
The for:ming of the Canfederati<!m inspired fear in Chile and 
Argentina that Santa Cruz had ambi tiona to expand his power. Santa 
Cruz tried to allay these fears through a circular letter addressed to 
the governments of Amerioa en August 20, 1836. * In the letter he sta-
ted that the Seuth American states, instead of being perturbed because 
of nthe creatien of a bedy politic in whose structure were to be ca~ 
bined the secial guarantees with stability of power and energy of action, 
should view this organization as a guaranty of order, as a dike erec-
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ted against tlae terrent 0f anarchy, and as a suitable amalgam ef il'l.ter-
ests that had been discG>rdant lilp to the present time." However, this 
reassurance -was to n.o avail, and both Chile and Argen.tina declared war 
on Bolivia and after several battles, the Confederate ar.m;r was defeat-
ed at the eattle of Yungay on January 20, 1839, and the Peru-Bolivia 
Confederation was subsequently dissolved. Some historians claim t:m.at 
had Santa Cruz reali.zed his dream of uniting Bolivia and Peru under a 
single rule, an Inean federatiG>n might have served to shield their pe<r>-
ple again~t foreign aggression. 
From the time of Santa Cruz•s defeat and the consequent dis-
ruption of the Confederation, Belivia lived in a state of complete an-
archy and political unrest. From 18.42 to 1898, there were mere than 
sixty revolutions, six presidents were assassinated and many ethers 
were driven :into e:xi:le. 
4. War of the Pacific* 
The cenfliot designated by Seliltla Amerieans as tlae UWar of the 
Pacific" was actually the tragic climax of a controversy between Chile 
and Bolivia involving the exploitation of the nitrate deposits in the 
coastal region. I'G was a struggle that began iE. 18'7<9 and lasted l!mtil 
18$4, and in which Peru became a belligerent mainly because ef. a secret 
treaty which she had with Bolivia. Po0r leadership under President 
Daza, Whose dictatorship rule·had becG.me notorious for corruption and 
arbitrary imprisonments led to eventaal defeat of the Peruvian-~olivian 
army at Tarapaoa, and the resultant deprivation of Bolivia of all ao-
oess te tke sea. 
*d.B, PP• 661-663 
In 1$9,, the Liberal political party von the presidency and 
oontrol ef the government, and remained in pewer until 1920. This was 
:probably the period of greatest progress and stability. It was during 
thpse two decades that the relationship between the Church and the 
State was settled, and that the special courts or Ufueros" of t:m.e pri-
vileged groups were abolished. Some improvement was made in educatiolll.-
al facilities, and the capital, 'With. the exception of the Supreme Court, 
was moved from Sucre to LaPaz; the latter being the largest city as well 
as the political and oommercial center of the country.# 
In 1920, a Republican opposition party was for.med Which re-
belled against the rule by the Liberals, and took over the reins of the 
government under President Bautista Saavedra.* 
5 • I:n:flm: of Foreign Capital 
By this time, American oapi ta.lists were playing an important 
part in the finances 0f Bolivia. The Saavedra Administration, needing 
money badly, was forced to consolidate a number of large French loans 
in. to a new refunding American loan know. as th.e Nicelaus Loan.'** 
The loan, amounting to $33,000,000 at eight per cent interest 
plus eight per oent commission fee, owes its name to the fact that it 
was :negetiated by the St. Lollis banking fir.m Stifel-NioGlaus, in assoo-
iatien 'With the Equitable Trust CGmpany of New York, 'Who acted as trus-~ 
tee. Illcredible. as it may seem, liloli.~SJ. pledged more tha:m. one-half of 
her entire natienal revenue as security for the payment of this loa:m.. 
So singular w.s the extent of tlais pledge, made by a veak and udevel-
#Sacre is still the official capital of Bolivia. 
*13, P• 650. 
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oped South American state, that the author has thought it indispensable 
to include a cap,r of part of the original contract in an appendix. 
Not only were the entire customs receipts, which represented 
at this time almost half of Bolivia's revenues, pledged, but even some 
direct taxes, in particular, those on the net profits of mining com-
panies and on the net income of banks. Furthermore, in order to make 
absolutely sure that the collection of taxes would take place, there 
was a stipulation in the contract to the effect that a Permanent Fiscal 
Commission consisting of three, two members of Which were to be nomina-
ted by the American bankers, was to actually supervise the collection of 
taxes in Bolivia during the life of the loan.* In addition, the Ameri-
can chairman of this Permanent Fiscal Commission was, by presidential de-
cree, appointed as the inspector-general of banks and state monopolies. 
From the point of view of the Wall Street bankers, this w.s the 
doctrine of "caveat emptor"# at its best. 
Taking into consideration the stringenc.y and severeness of the 
terms of the Nicolaus Loan, the question arises as to whether American 
investors were justified in condemning the Bolivian people 'When they de-
faulted on their bonds two years after the catastrophic market crash of 
1929. It seems rather, that it could be laid at the door of the bankers, 
who in their haste to ·make a "fast buck," so to speak, put aside their 
usual good judgment, and urged an unwise refunding upon a country so 
financially distressed, that it literally had to paw.n a considerable 
portion of its entire national revenue in order to service the loans. 
#Let the buyer beware. 
*ll, p. 101. 
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Even President Roosevelt, in 1~43, apologized to Bolivia f0r 
these loans, a.n.d termed them llbad neigkborliness on the part of some 
Wall Street bankers. n* 
)$. Concessions to the Standard Oil Company, 
Concurrent rl th these netorious loans, American industrial 
promoters bad undertaken to develop Bolivia's petroleum resources. Hew-
ever, the Saavedra administration, in order to Ji>lacate charges th.at it 
was selling out the country t0 fereigners, passed a law on June 16, 1921~ 
which was construed to be an attempt to conserve the coun.tryr s oil, and 
which limited the extent of petroleum la:hd that any person or corporation 
oolll.d exploit t0 100,000 hectares.# It also restricted all eil conces-
sions to a period of fifty-five years, and decreed that the government 
should be paid a maximum royalty of eleven per cent of the value of the 
petroJ.eum produced. Yet in spite of this law, and because of grants 
which had been made iE. 1920, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company 
of New Jersey was carrying on explorations for oil in a vast area of 
4,000,000 hectares. 
1. The Chaco 'War 
The casual observer ef the Chaco War between Bolivia and Para-
guay would probably have described it as resembling ntwo ba.l.dheaded men 
fighting over a comb.n Bu.t to the student of Lajdn American. affairs, 
the Chaco 'War is much more significant. It was an apparently senseless 
and bloody struggle in "Which many thousands of Belivian.s and Paraguay-
#Almost 250,000 acres. 
*118, p. 5 
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ana lest their lives.* Yet, there are some writers that claim tb.at the 
rank and file Indian fighters of both countries were mere pawns and pup-
pets in the affair, and that the real forces behind the scene were the 
big British and American eil cempanies avariciously fighting ever the 
Chaco's rich petroleum deposits. 
The boundary question between Bolivia and Paragua.y,had existed 
for ever a century.** Yet it was only when petrolellllt ooncessiens and 
colonizing privileges were granted to American and British corporations, 
and extensive loans were made by bankers of those countries to Bolivia, 
that the question became acute. Even Sena. tor Huey Long of' Louisiana, 
en several oceasiens, charged on the floor of the ~nited States Senate, 
that the Standard Oil Cempany of New Jersey was aiding Bolivia against 
Paraguay .ll Here is an excerpt from c:ne of his tirades against the eil 
company:~ 
11 'fb.e Standard Oil Cempany ef New Jersey, an American 
Corporation, the prcmoter of revolutions in Central America, 
South America and Mexice ever since they have wanted eil 
concessiens, has found it necessary to have the Chaco 
territory. 
Tlaey have discovered oil in the Ohaco and in Bolivia. 
It seems that it will cost considerable money for them to 
reach the deep water wi tb. the oil of the Standard Oil Com-
pany which has been discovered in Bolivia and therefore Bo-
ll via finds itself in need of a pipe line route to the 
navigable Paraguayan rivers Which it does not want to ac-
quire on such terms and ccndi tiona as will lDe required by 
the Paragaayan Government. 
#On July 23, 1'34, Paraguay announced that it planned a Memorandum te 
the League (i)f Na tiens charging the Standard Oil Company w:i. th backing 
Bolivia. 
*13, P• 6>69 
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The Standard e>il Company ef the Yni ted States and 
Gther affiliated interests have been guilty of promoting 
this "War and financing Bolivia. u 
It goes without saying that the Standard Oil Oompa.ny repeated-
ly and categorically denied that it was interested in a pipe line across 
the Chaco, or that it w.s aiding Bolivia. However, suff'icient doubt 
had been cast into peoples minds to give rise to a suspicion that the 
Chaco War was the result of foreign entanglements. Particularl:y, in. 
viev E>f the fact that here were two almost totally underdeveloped South 
American states, in the middle of the Great Depressien, both of' them 
comparatively worse of'f f'il!la.ncially than other countries of the world. 
Bolivia was almost three-quarters hypothecated te the Ynited States. 
Yet, they were able to finance the expenditures iB.volved ·b. the business 
of war. -This paradox and others led to considerable speculation as te 
the real causes of the Chaco War. 
(i:)n the other hand, c::>ther observers have stated that neither 
foreigners nor foreign capital had much to do 'With the war.* It is their 
belief that the fundamental cause can be found in the character, racial 
pride, and common jealousies of the two belligerent nations, together 
with their desire for expansion. 
'Whatever the causes of the Chaco War, it will be remembered in. 
Bolivia as a long-drawn out blood-letting which intensified Bolivia's 
poverty, decimated her already scanty manpower, and started a process of 
currena,r inflation and rising living costs that completely disequili-
brated her eoonomw. 
*37, P• 468 
III. Tin 
Tin is undoubtedly one of the most vi tal and important metals 
existing in the world today. Moreover, this importance is becoming in-
creasingly great as industrialization everywhere grows in complexity 
and completeness. Paradoxically, the United States, probably the most 
advanced nation in the world, and the greatest consumer of tin, is 
totally lacking in commercial tin-ore deposits and therefore, wholly 
dependent on foreign sources. 
A. Early Histo;ry of Tin 
I 
It cannot be definitely ascertained 'When tmalloyed tin was 
first introduced. However, tin is known to have been used as one of 
the elements of bronze before the dawn of recorded history.* The 
story is told that prehistoric man may have discovered tin While in the 
nightly process of bankjng or putting out his fire by covering it with 
handfuls of black alluvial sand. On one of these occasions, it is en-
tirely probable that the sand used contained detrital cassiterite.· The 
following morning he may have found little bits of a bright, shiny new 
element. 
1. Use of Tin Durffig the :Bronze Age 
However, the discovery of metallic tin may have taken place, 
it has been established that it was used to a considerable extend dur-
ing the Bronze Age in the manufacture of weapons and toels. Close 
examjnation and study of these early artifices, which varied in tin 
content from four te sixteen per oent, disclosed that the amount of 
tila used in each tool or weapon was not due merely to chance, but that 
*14, P• l. 
:l.t was actually attributable to the skill of the smiths belonging ts 
the more advanced stage of the Bronze ·Age. Br0nze sword blades dating 
Da.ok te .3500 B.O. have been found in. royal tombs in the ancient town 
. . 
of Ur on the Euphrates River, a site sometimes denominated as the cradle 
of civilization. 
That tin was kno1m in biblical times is evendenced by the re-
ference made to it by Moses in the book of Numbers. The metal was 
called "bedil" in Hebrew, and was later translated to 11 cassiteros" and 
usta.nnumtr in the Greek and Latin versions respectively.* 
It is also known that the ,Egyptians were using tin from 700 -
0000 B.C. This fact was established by the discovery of a strip of tin 
in the wrappings of an. Egyptian lilllllllilY of that period.** 
2. Phoenician Tin Trade 
There is general agreement among writers that most of the ti:a 
used in the East and Middle East by the ancient peoples was taken there 
by the Phoenicians from the Cassiterides Islands. The great question 
seems to center on the location of the islands. There has been much 
speculation on the matter. However, the theory that the Cassiterides 
Islands most nearly correspond to the Scilly and Channel Islands, seems 
to be the one most generally correborated b.r archaelegists. Moreover, 
evidence has been discovered to substantiate the fact that tfie Phoeni-
cians may have worked the tin :mines in Cornwall, England, long before 
the Roman conquest.*** . Apparently, Phoenicians had gone there as colo-
nists and had, in fact, established a monopoly i:m. the production and 
*14, p. 1. 
**10, P• 8. 
***1.4, p. 2. 
trade of tin. 
There is no knowledge as to e:xactly how long the Phoenicians 
maintained their monopoly, but is estilna.ted that it may have been as 
long as 300 to 400 years until about 600 B.c.* It appears, however, that 
at the end of this period, the location of the "Tin Islands11 was finally 
discovered by other nations, and many people came to work in the mines. 
There are two things of which there appears to be no doubt; 
that the first tin worked for many ages was taken exclusively from al-
luvium; and that during the 17th and 18th centuries, Cornwall was the 
main source of the world t s supply of tin. The average annual produc-
tion for Cornwall during the 17th and 18th centuries appears to have been 
1,200 and 2,600 tons respectively. 
B. Minerals Containing Tin 
1. Cassiterite 
Tin is derived mainly from cassiterite, a mineral, which is 
usually dark-colored, with a non~etallic luster and about as hard as 
ordinary steel. This mineral is often called tin-ore, but this is 
supposedly incorrect since the use of this term should be restricted 
to ores containing the mineral, and not applied also to the concen-
trates of the mineral obtained from ore, or from stanniferous alluvial 
or ~lluvial deposits.** 
Cassiterite, or tinstone, as most authors prefer to call it, 
is a dioxide of tin, and when chemically pure, which is very rarely 
indeed, has a metallic content of 78.6 per cent tin. Besides the dark-
*10, P• 3. 
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colored cassiterite, there are varieties which have other colors such 
as: yellow rosin tb., yellow wax tin_, and red ruby tin. 
2. Sta.nni te 
In addition to cassiterite, stanni te is the only other min-
eral imp0rtant as a source of tin.* Stannite is a sulfide of tin, 
copper and iron, and is occasionally known as tin pyrites or bell-metal 
ore. Its color is steel-gray "When pure, and frequently it is iron-
black or bronze with an incidental bluish tarnish. Only in Bolivia has 
stannite been found to occur in quantities of economic or commercial 
importance. 
Beth tins tone and sta.nni te are found in veins o£ granitic ori-
gin.** Both are resistant to weathering, and therefore, accunru.late as 
residual deposits. 
Other minerals containing an insignificant amount of tin, ~d 
consequently, of no commercial val.1lle, are: cylindri te, franckei te, can-
fiel.dite, teallite, and plumbostannite. 
3. Native Tin 
A few words should be said about tin occurring in its native 
state. From time to time . there have been reports of people finding a 
few grains of pu:r;-e metal.lia tin in the vicinity of tinfieii.ds. However, 
on closer examination, the products found have generally proved to be 
the products of ancient smel.ting. One author ventures the opinion, 
that if any pure tin has been found, it has not been sufficient to plate 
a sheet large enough to make one sardine can.*** 
*10, p. 52. 
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0. Properties and Characteristics of Tin 
Contrary to popular belief, tia, though common and well-known, 
is a much scarcer element than many others 'Which we as so cia te w1 tJa the 
qua.li ty of ral'i ty. 
1. Coler 
Tin is 'White, with a slight tinge of blue. Tin and nioke:L 
placed side by side make the latter appear brown. 'When ohromilllll. is oom-
pared with tin, the former leoks definitely blllle. Tin is also relative-
ly 'Wb.i ter than either sll ver or sino. Tin has a luster 'Whose brllliance 
is determined by the temperature of the metal at the time of casting.* 
Should the temperature be teo low, its surface will be dull. On the 
otb.er,hand, if the temperature is too high, irridisoent ool®rs will ap-
pear en its surface as a oensequenoe of oxide films. 
2. Straotlllre 
Tin has a decided crystalline structure. This property of the 
metal is dramatically proved by the characteristic creaking sound which 
is thrown off "Whenever a bar of tin is bent.** This 11 cry" of tin re-
sul ts from the grinding of the crystals against each other during the 
bending of the me~. At one time, this -was regarded as a test of the 
purity of the metal; laowever, tlais is no lenger true. 
3. Other Properties 
The melting point of tin is 232° Centrigrade, or approximately 
450° Fahrenheit. Its specific gravity is nearly 7 .3, and its hardness 
lies between lead and gold. Pure tin, and rich tin alloys are highly 
*14, P• 14• 
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malleable, consequently, it is :possible to roll them into extremely 
thin feU. Furthermore, tin is :plastic at the temperature of boiling 
w.ter, and can be dra'WD. int0 thin wire. Also, at a point just below 
its melting point, it can be crushed to a pewder in a mortar. One of 
the most peculiar characteristics of tin, is its acute sensitivity te 
very low temperatures. F0r example, if' objects made of pure tin 
should be taken to the Arctic regions, the extreme cold would cause 
the tin to decoonpese into fragments.. This is a fact that should be 
remembered if' tin is to be used in an llll!la.lleyed state either in refri-
** geration, or in abnormally cold climates. 
A serviceable feature of tin, particularly in connectien 
with the use of tin plate of all types, is that it is not readily af-
fected b,y either dry or moist air at erdinary temperatures.*** 
Other characteristics of tin are: it is soft and can be out 
easily witb. a larlf'e; its electrical cenductivity is about one-seventh. 
that of silver; it is not affected b,y hydrogen; it is little affected 
by ordinary temperatures, bat it does acquire a tarnish; finally, tin 
poisoning from cooking utensils and tin cans used in the preservatien 
of food, is almost non-existent. 
D. lJses of Tin 
Tin, undeubtedly, owes its utility to four of its particular 
properties, these are: its lew melting point, its non-toxic quality, 
its mallea. 9ili ty, and its resistance to oerresion. Because tin in its 
*14, p. 14. 
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molten state adheres readily to other metals, it has been used siBoe 
early times for plating copper and other utensils by- the simple method 
of pouring a little melted tin into the utensil and out again. As a 
matter of fact, tinplate itself is made on the same principle; that is, 
simply dipping sheets of steel into a bath of molten tiB. 
l. Tin Plate 
In the United States, the greatest amount of tin goes into 
the manufacture of tin plate.# Tin plate, in turi:l, is used for tJae most 
part in the ma.ld.mg of the lowly tin can, sometimes viewed by people a-
broad as symbolizing the "American way of life.n It is estimated that 
22 'billien cans are used in the 1Jnited States during the average year. 
In passing, it should be noted that a "tin can" should reall:y' 
be called a steel oan, ina.smu.ch as it is generally 99 and one-half per 
cent steel, and E>nly mne-half of E>ne per cent tin. In other words, a 
"tin can" is steel plate coated with a film of tin which is .0005 of an 
inch thick. 450 No. 2 tin oans oan be made with bu.t a single pound ef 
* tin. 
2. Solder 
The second largest use of tin is in the manufacture of solder. 
Solder, an alloy of lead and tin, has manii'eld uses, it is one of the 
most im.pertant industrial metals, and consumes about 2.3 per cent of our 
tin supp:cy. 
3. Babhitt 
Babhi tt, a metal requiring about 85 per cent tin, is widely 
#See '.rab1e 'I 
*22, P• 20. 
TABLE I 
DOMESTIC USES OF TIN 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY TIN CONTENT IN LONG TONS 
Pre duet 1941 1942 1943 
Tin Plate ••••••••••••.•• 44,854 28,522 21,?26 
Terne Plate •••••••••••• 2,046 882 434 
Selder ••••••••••••••••• 28,225 1.3,924 12,676 
Babbitt ••••••••.••••••• 10,599 6,099 7,753 
Bronze and Brass ••••••• 23,170 27,655 29,755 
Collapsible tubes •••••• 4,445 1,099 591 
Tinn1mg•••••••••••••••• 4,132 3,015 3,014 
Foil ........... , •.•..... 4,292 576 372 
Chemiaals(exaept oxide) 970 246 411 
Tin exide •••••••••••••• 1,490 131 
Pipe and tubing •••••••• 1,325 161 200 
T.ype metal ••••••••••••• 1,815 1,15.3 1,081 
Galvanizing •••••••••••• 967 S2 4 
Bar tin. •••••••••••••••• 2,1.33 722 961 
Miscellaneous alleys ••• 617 814 926 
White metal. •••••••••••• 2,561 239 145 
Misaellaneous •••••••••• 1,954 367 281 
Tetal ......... , . ..••• 134,695 85,687 . 80,330 
SOtm.OE: John :B. DeMille, Strategie Mb.erals. New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 194'7, p. 484. 
used for 'Bearings fer rolling stook and maob.i:nes. Consequently', the 
'Wheels of industry could not gG on without it. 'lin also plays a vi tal 
role in the manufacture of brenze, an amalgamation of copper and tin, 
and the oldest known Bronze is indispensable to the production ef strong, 
easily machined, non-corroding parts, and it has inn"Wnerable other uses. 
Not nearly so im.perta.nt, bu.t werthy of mention, are the se-
veral thousand tons of tin used in the packaging industries and in the 
making of collapsible t11bes, tin foil, and type metal.. 
4. Mill ta.ry tif ses 
Modern warfare has made thl a strategic :milileral of vital. im-
pertanoe. Thl is needed for the ma.nllfacture of htm.dreds of items clas-
sified as military equipment. According to a recent statement made by 
General J'. Lawten Collins, every M-4 7 armored tank requires 100 potmds 
ef tin.* 
E. Tin Crisis During World "W'ar II 
Th.e tin shortage faced by the United Nations during 'World 
War II is not to be f0rg0tten. Vi th three q1llB.rters 0f the world t s sup-
ply of tin in enemy hands, the United Nati0ns feund themselves forced 
to reduce consumpti0n of tin drastically. The sharply C'l'lrtailed supply', 
however, gave a tremendous urgency to the research for tin substitutes 
that had been carried on for many years in the United States. A most 
important centribution ef this time was the introduction of an electra-
lytic tta-plate process to replace the antiquated hat-dipped tin-plate. 
Although the electrolytic tin coati.Dg is 'W.t one-third the thickness ef 
the coating farmed 'by the hot dip method, it provides the same degree of 
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proteotion. 
Tinless solders, and oompulsory employment of substi tu.tes in 
lrm.m.dreds of articles, made a further saving of thousands of tons of tin 
a year. Many of the su"bsti tutions were n9t papular with consumers. 
F. World's Tin Suppliers 
It has been noted that the United States oonsumes, and has 
consumed annually for many years, about half of the total world tin cGn-
Sllmption. Yet, exploratien has indicated that, except in the extreme 
North and South, the North American continent has .m.o commercial deposits. 
In this respect, the 0ther continents of the wrld are far more fortu-
nate. Th.e heaviest concentrations of tin, hewever, occur in two major 
areas, which are: a narrow belt tha. t extends southeast fr0lll Malaya i:m.-
to the Netherlands East Indies; and another belt that nms southeast 
through the Andes Motmtains of Peru and Bolivia. 
l. Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia, the area comprising Malaya, Indonesia and 
Thailand, is known as the world's most productive tin-bearing regiem .• 
This regiEm extends southeast a thousand miles from Ra.ngeon through the 
Malay Peninsula to the Dutch East Indies. In 1951, Southeast Asia pro-
duoed 102,357 long tons of tin-in concentrates out of the world's total 
of 164,440.* The tin deposits in this part of the world are mainly of 
tb.~ alluvial and residual type, making them ideal for exploitation.** 
It is to be noted that the greatest part of the tin output comes from 
:n:mnerous small produoers, and that hand labor is used extensively. 
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_2. A£rioa# 
Afriaa is the fourth largest produaer of tin with an output 
'Which averages 25,000 lcmg tons a year. The bulk of this tins tone in 
Africa comes from secondary stanniferous deposits. The laak ef suffi-
cient water durilag most of the year is the prinai!)8.1.-f.aotor limiting 
production, since -water is extremely imp0rtant ilil working secondary de-
posits by the usual methods. Another detrimental factor is inadeqlll.ate 
transportation • 
.3.. Australia 
Australia is no longer an important prod1ll.oer of tin, but is 
ef historical significance b.Y virtue of its having led world production 
during the 1B7o•s. Her production of tin during that ten year period 
amounted t0 40,000 tens. Australia 1 s decline in importance is not due 
:so mMch to lower production, as it is to a substantial increase in total 
world productio:ta.. Queensland, New South Wales, and Tasma:D.ia combined, 
still produce on the average of 3,000 tons a year. 
As has been stated, tin has never be~n fe>u:nd in the United 
States in sufficient quantities to be commercially or economically im-
portant.* This does not mean, however, that no tin has been found. 
Small amounts have been found in California,· New Mexico, Nevada, Virginia, 
North and South Carolina, South Dakata, and Texas; minute traces, also, 
in Alabama, Cennecticut,·Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, 'Washingto:ta., and 'Wyoming. The only commercial production ef 
tin from the l'Jni ted States and its territories occurs in Alaska 'Where a 
#Nigeria and the Belgian Congo 
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few tons are recovered annually as a b.y-product of gold m1n1ng. 
G. Tin Prices and Control 
1. The Pre-Cartel Period 
Before March 1 1 19.31, the date the International Tin Commit-
tee came into being 1 the price offered for tim concentrates was usually 
based on the free market price effective at the date of deli very, the 
date of sale, or on the average of a stated number of market days. 'l'b.e 
markets generally accepted as basic were the London Metal Exchange mar-
ket for standard tim; the Singapore and Penang markets, Where the prices 
were based on Lond0n prices after deductions for freight, insurance, 
interest, and other charges had been made; and the New York market·for 
standard tin. 
Most tin ores require concentration, being of too low a grade 
for direct smelting. The purchase of tin concentrates, therefore, is 
made on a standard basis of 60 per cent tin, and the price is reduced 
for each fraction below 60 per cent. Moreever, penalties are charged 
if there is sulfur in the concentrates in excess of one per cent, or 
iron, in excess of five per cent. 
The limited, though :important, use of tin in industry makes it 
particularly vulnerable to overproduction. The amount of tin that en-
ters into any one product is so small that the falling prices caused b.y 
a world-wide surplus will not substantially increase consumpticm. In 
the language of the economist, demand for tin is relatively inelastic. 
Since the turn of the century, world production of tin has in-
creased rapidly and steadily. World tin consumption, on the other hand, 
has not kept abreast of output. This lag in consumption gave rise to 
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chaotic condi tiona in supply, price, and demand. The extreme price 
fluctuations were particularly disastrous to the greatest tin producing 
countries due to their dependence on a monoproductimn economy. 
2. The International Tin Conmdttee 
The inevitable outcome of this economic instability was the 
organization on March 1, 19.31, of the tin cartel known as the Interna-
. * . tional Tin Committee. Originally, members were British Malaya, Boli-
via, Netherlands East Indies, and Nigeria. However, it did not become 
effective 1mtil the latter part of 19.32, by wich tillle existing tin 
stoaks had shrunk materially. 
During the year 19.32, tin was 22 cents a pound. But in 19.3.3 
it averaged .39 cents, and was held at about 50 cents for the remainder 
of the 1930's. 
The tin cartel aroused considerable resentment in the United 
States because t1ae Connnittee was a producers' group 'Which had failed teD 
inolude any representative of the greatest tin-consuming country. Need-
less to say, the accelerated rise in the price of tin stimulated re-
search by American packaging industries to find satisfactory substitutes. 
Although the substitution of cellophane, cardboard, aluminum foil, and 
', aluminum tubes for tin did not materially decrease the consumption of 
tin, it may have reduced the potential demand. Moreover, it placed the 
United States in a far better position to stand the drastic curtail-
ment of tin supplies during World War II. 
As a result of the increased demand caused by the outbreak of 
*142 p. 1172. 
the "War in 19.391 the tin cartel countries, in 1940, for the first time 
were 'Ullable to produce the quotas allowed them. Contributory. to the 
increased demand was heavy buying by the United States government-ow.nea 
Metal Resetve Company, 'Which was authorized to purchase 75,000 tans of 
tin for a strategic stockpile. 
For all practical purposes, the International Tin Committee 
ceased to function after the capitulation of the British in 1942, though 
it remained officially in existence until December .31, 1946.* 
,3. The International Tin Study Group 
At the end of World War II, many of the tin producers were 
strongly in favor of extending the Tin Control Scheme in order to pre-
vent the return of disorderly industry conditions as soon as a surplus 
in supply should arise. There was immediate opposition to the exten-
sion of the Scheme on the part of consuming countries, partiotU.arly from 
the United States. The stand of the United States "Well the support ef 
the British government for a plan to place the problem of tin production 
and distribution in the hands of a Tin Study Group, which would be se-
parate and distinct from the International Tin Committee. The plan was 
consequently adopted at a conference of producing and consuming ooun-
tries held in Geneva in October 194'1 but only after mu.ch disagreement 
and general dissatisfaction.** The main objections appeared to be 
that the Tin Study Group would have no real authority and hence, would 
serve merely as an advisory group. 
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H. Future of Tin 
There appear to be two distinct views as te the future of 
tin. The optimistic view seems te be that, on the 'Whole, any immediate 
sharp reduction i:n the use ef tin by the 'United States and by the world 
in general ja unlikely. This hypothesis assumes that as world popula-
tion grows, the need for tin will grow also. More people to feed means 
more tin. cans will be needed. More houses mean more solder for elec-
trical and plumbing equipment. Increased automobile production will re-
quire more tin for bearings. M<»reover, science is constantly discov~--. 
r;tag new ways for tin to serve mankind. In short, the aptimistio out-
look for tin centers on the oontentien that there is no danger of its 
becoming obsolete. 
Tb.e pessimistic view is ominous, to say the least. Further-
more, it is <»ne 'Which the author is inclined to support as mere realis-
tic. This argument assumes relative inelasticity of demand for tin as 
well as a tendency for world production to exceed world consumption. 
In view of present world conditions, it is not very likely that any 
widespread increase in consumption will take place, simply because the 
industrial use of tin presupposes a relatively high level of living. 
Findings by the Tin Research Institute, an organization financed by the 
main producing countries, show insignificant results from efforts te 
discover new uses for tin. 
To aggravate matters further, the lag in consumption has not 
discouraged producti0n by the mines. Many of the mines are producing 
to capacity and for a very important reason. The prosperity of the 
three main producing regions, Malaya, Indonesia, and Bolivia, is com-
pletely dependent on full-scale prod~ction. Inasmuch as tin is the 
bulwark of their economies, a curtailment in production and resultant 
widespread unemployment would create a national crisis. 
The Gravity of the matter lies in the fact that capacity 
production and a consumption lag cannot continue indefinitely without 
serious repercussions. Undoubtedly, some companies would be forced to 
shut down. But every time a mine is forced to suspend operations, the 
world loses that much of its reserves of unmined tin. This, the ex-
perts contend, is because once a tin mine is allowed to flood, its re-
epening is too costly to be justified by the potential returns from the 
ore remaining under water. 
It is evident that the tin industry presents problems that 
are of tremendous portent to both producers and consumers. Yet, appar-
ently, little is being done. The objectives of the Tin Study Group 
include the stabilization of prices, the insurance of adequate supplies 
of tin at all times, and the discovery of new industrial uses, but to 
date, no practical or working agreements have been made. 
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IV. Bolivia, A Source of Tin 
There is a Bolivian metaphor which describes that nation as 
"a beggar sitting on a bag of gold.n In some respects truer words 
were never spoken because, although little actual gold has been found 
in Bolivia, her subsoil is fabulously rich in other minerals. But 
this mineral wealth, instead of being a blessing and an asset, has be-
come a curse and a liability to her impoverished people. Bolivia's 
subsoil treasures have served as a perennial magnet to the type of 
foreign investor who thinks 0nly in terms of :making quick and large pro-
fits, and 'Who has no interest in the broad economic development of the 
area. The inevitable result has been that Bolivians have been the vic-
tims of exploitation for five hundred years, b,y foreigners seeking per-
sonal enrichment. 
Prosaic tin, rather than:::the ll1Qr..e .. r6.mantie gold. 6r si:+ver; has 
been Bolivia's most economically important metal during the last half 
century. Bolivia and tin are inseparably integrated. For fifty years 
Bolivians have been living and dying in accordance with the gleaming 
llestaiio" that is torn from the bowels of their nwuntains with such 
painful efforts. 
A. History of Tin in Bolivia 
It is thought that Bolivian tin-mining ante-dates the era of 
the Spanish Conquistadores. This belief has been substantiated by the 
discovery of ancient bronze artifacts among the ruin.s of the pre-con-
quest Aymara Indian villages located on the shores of Lake Ti tioaca. 
It appears that the natives used tin along with copper, probabl:y' not 
knowing tin as a distinct metal, but knowing nevertheless, that tin 
melted 'With copper formed a new metal of additional strength, greater 
hardness, and heat-resistant qualities. 
1. Spanish Rejection of Tin 
Ylhen the Spanish came to Bolivia in 1544, they found the In-
diana working bGth silver and tin area, the latter though, only as a by-
product. The Incas at that time did not attach great connn.ercial im-
partance to tin. Later, the Spaniards also rejected the metal, and used 
it only as refuse to fill in cavities and depressions in the ground 
around the silver mines.* ·These dump heaps or desmontes were later the 
source of much rich ore. 
It -was quite natural for the Spaniards to scorn tin since it 
was being more cheaply supplied to Europe currently frem sources en 
that continent.** During a period of sixty years, beg:inn:ing from the 
time ef the conquest to the end of the sixteenth century, the mountains 
of Bolivia furnished hall' ·of all the silver produced in the world. As 
late as 1890, tin still -was not considered valuable enough to mine since 
the market price for one hundred pa>unds of tinstone concentrates was 
barely five dollars. 
2. United States D~onetizes Silver 
Silver continued to be mined in Bolivia until 1893 at 'Which 
time the 'United States Government announced that it was d~onetizing 
silver, and was ad0pting the gold standard. This action on the part of 
the United Sta tea caused an al:m.ost immediate drop in the price of Boli-
*17, P• 328 
**17, P• 327 
so 
vian exchange. The exchange crisis, combined with. the increased oem-
petitio~ which Bolivia was facing from other silver-producing countries, 
made it unprofitable for the silver mines to continue operations • 
.3. Acceleration of Tin Production 
The decline of silver marked the turning point for tin. The 
price of tin then was 52 pounds sterling per ton, and due to the break 
in silver, this represented twice as many Bolivianos as before. Oen-
sequentl.y, the expl0itation of tin -was begun in earnest. With the re-
markable growth of the tin plate industry, the introduction of tin in-
to many new uses, and the decreased output of former tin deposits, it 
vas not long until the price of tin had advanced from $350 a ton in 
1898 to $960 in 1912. * The new price gave a powerful impetus to the 
Bolivian industry, and as a result, Bolivia found herself shot inte pro-
minence as one of the great producers of tin. 
B. Distribution of Tin Deposits: in Bolivia 
The Bolivian Altiplano has been accurately described as beimg 
metallogenic.** Tin deposits in association with silver, bisnro.th, and 
tungsten ores, are generously distributed throughout the eastern range 
of the Andes know. as the Cordillera Real, from the vicinity of Lake 
Titioaoa in the north, al:mo.st to the Argentine boundary on the south .. 
It is a peculiar fact, however, that the tin ores seem to be limited b.1 
the Peruvian border i:n the northwest and the Argentinian border in the 
south. If tin depesits do exist outside the boundaries of Bolivia, they 
hav.e not been considered of commercial or economic value. 
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Notwithstanding the large number of deposits and the many mines 
in operation, the fact remains that the greatest production is closely 
concentrated. Eight important centers of production account for approxi-
mately 90 per eent of the country's output, of 'Which at least 50 per cent 
comes from the mines of Hua.nuni-Yncia-Llallagua.* The other important 
,. 
centers are: Oruro, Merococala, Pazna, Potosi, and Ohorolque. Mach 
disagreement exists among -writers as to the tin content of the ores fotmd 
in this regi0n. Some of them say that the ore varies in content from 
Qne to forty per cent with the average being about 6 per cent. Others 
are more conservative and state that the rich ores carry 6 to 8 per cent 
with the average closer to 3 per cent. 
C. Adversity of Locatien and Relief 
It seems as though nature has deliueratel~ plotted against the 
exploitation of Bolivia's mineral resources. The countryrs central lo-
catien, the ruggedness of her tepography, her inaccessibility to the sea 
and her inability to utilize what navigable rivers she has, have made 
the transportation of minerals extremely difficult. 
L High Cost of Transportation 
Before the building of railroads, the tin concentrates could 
be transported to the west coast ports only with the help of beasts of 
burden, of 'Which only the llama. is adapted te high altitude and rari-
fied atmosphere. The llama's carrying capacity, however, is limited to 
loads not exceeding 100 pounds. After the railroads aame into use, the 
amount of ore that could be Shipped vastly increased. Nevertheless, 
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the cost of shipping remained disproportienately high as evidenced b,y 
the follewing table:* 
Mining and conveying to concentrating mills ••••••••• 
So:rti.ng a.n.d handling •.••..••.•••••••.•••• " ••••.•.••• 
MiJ 1 :Jng and assaying ••••••••••••••••••••••••• , ••• · ••• 
General Expenses•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••e•••••• 
Cost of Production ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Railroad freight to Guaqui on Lake Titicaca ••••••••• 
Railroad freight from Guaqui to the port of Mollendo 
Ocean freight framMollendo to Europe ••••••••••••••• 
Cost of transportation to smelter •••••••••••••••• 
Export duties •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Commissions, insurance, etc •••••••••••••••••••••• 
Total cost laid down at smelter in Europe •••••••• 
Per Ton 
$ 4-78 
.48 
1.51 
.3e 
35.88 
10.14 
7.80 
$ 7.13 
53.82 
15.60 
10.92 
$87.47 
Three facts stand out in sharp focus in the above table; 
the very low cost of production of the tin concentrates, the exceeding-
ly high cost of transportation to the coastal ports, and finally, the 
comparitively low cost of the ocean freight from the South American 
coast to Europe. 
The above figures represent conditions prevailing in 1914 and1 
therefore, are out of date. However, the significant factor, 'Which has 
undergone little change, is the high cost of carrying the ores from the 
concentration mills to the ports of Antofagasta and /Erica, Chile, and 
to Mollendo1 Peru. Admittedly, many serious problems jeopardize the 
competitive position of Bolivia's tin mining industry, but these exces-
sive1 and seemingly unescapable transportation costs undoubtedly are 
the most serious. 
2. Lack of Fuel 
The high altitude of the Altiplano adds other difficulties to 
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the minjng of tin. Many of the tin mines are above the tree line. 
Therefore, wood for fuel is not available. Furthermore, with no work-
able coal lmmm to exist in the area, the importation of fuel is sine 
qua non. The imported fuel is supplemented by dried llama dung called 
"taquia" and a resinous shrub known as nyareta" which are bought from 
the Indians by the thousands of tons annually. 
3. EfficiencY Reduced by the Altitude 
Although there are opinions to the contrary, it is generally 
believed that the rarified atmosphere found at elevations of 12,000 to 
17,000 feet reduces the efficiency of human beings, as well as o£ 
beasts of burden and machines. The sea level rated horsepower of the 
latter allegedly decreases by three and one-half to four and one-half 
per cent for every 0ne thousand foot rise. The only pack animals a-
daptable to the highlands have been llamas and burros. A great :many 
mules have been imported for work in the mines, but with little suc-
cess and lllllCh less owing to their inability to adjust to climate and 
terrain. 
D. Labor for the Mines 
Much has been written about the scant supply and the poor 
quality of labor available to the Bolivian tin mining industry. Jt$~;1mpor­
ted workers eannot do hard physical labor in high altitudes,. the Indian 
communities have been the principal source of manpower for the mines, 
as well as for railroads, agriculture, and all other industries. It 
has generally been the lot of the Indians to do the more menial and 
more physically exhausting labor, while the mixed racial grelip, knoWl\1. 
locally as the Cholo group, undertakes the clerical and less important 
administrative duties. The mining companies have reserved the super-
visory and technical jobs for foreigners. 
This dependence upon the Indian population for labor imme-
diately gives rise to problems such as illiteracy, lack of organization, 
dispersion, constant migration from the land to the mines and back a-
gain, absenteeism, and perhaps greatest of all, the coca habit. 
1. Quality of Labor 
It has not been decided whether the poor quality of the work 
afforded by the Bolivian mine laborer is due to low wages and deplorable 
living conditions, or whether the low wages merely reflect the qualit,y 
of work and low productivity. Mauricio Hochschild, one of the ''Big 
Th.reen mine owners, is reportedly fond of saying that the Bolivian 
miner is relatively the highest paid laborer in the world, based on his 
estimate that it takes one of his miners one year to produce a single 
ton of tin. That this statement is probably an economic truism can 
hardly be denied; however, the writer doubts if that conveys and satis-
faction to the Indians w.no often have to toil under the most incredible 
conditions. 
2. Divergent Opinions on Effects of Altitude 
Among the books consul ted in the preparation of this study, 
only one author disagreed with the generally accepted theory that the 
high altitudes of the Bolivian Altiplano constitute a hardship to the 
average hum.an being. The dissident writer is Harry Osborne, author of 
** Indians of the Andes. 
Mr. Osborne emphatically discredits the generally accepted theory that 
the highland Indians have developed chest and lung capacity to compen-
sate for the rarified atmosphere of their habitat. He believes the 
compensation unnecessary because physiological reactions are brought a-
bout by both altitude and the oxygen content of the atmosphere, the 
latter depending on altitude as well as latitude. He goes on to say 
that since the Bali vian Andes lie within the torrid zone, atmospheric 
pressure there is greater than it would be at a similar altitude at 
latitudes more distant from the equator. Mr. Osborne theorizes further, 
saying that the di·scomf arts experienced by visitors to the Altiplano 
result from a combination of suggestibility and a too rapid change from 
the sea level atmosphere of the Pacific coast to the atmospheric con-
ditions of La Paz, which he considers comparable to a height of 5,500 
feet in the Alps. 
The writer has no quarrel with Mr. Osborne, but feels, never-
theless, that the theory that the effects can be attributed to sugges-
tibility, is not entirely valid as attested by the high death rate a-
mong the mules 'Which are imported to work in the mining districts. In 
an admittedly exaggerated contrast to Mr. Osborne's opinion, here is 
* part of what another writer has to say about the Bolivian Altiplanot 
In the desolate 15,000 foot altitude of the Bolivian 
mining country, the air is so thin as to induce violent nau-
sea in visiting White men, and so cold that one traveler 
claims to have seen the dung dropped by mules freeze before 
it hit the ground and explode moments later like the burst 
of rifle fire. 
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3. Working Conditions in the Mines 
To say that working aondi tiona in the ;Bolivian tin mines are 
bad is to put it mildly. All reports indiaa te that despite all the la.-
bor legislation and industrial benefits existing on paper, the situation 
is appalling. Eight hour day labor laws have meant nothing to the mine 
o'Wll.ers 'Who have kept the Indian miners in deep, underground, unventila-
ted shafts as many as 36 hours at a time.*: Many of the mines laaking 
other means of motive power, u~e the men to push the ore-laden rail oars 
in and out of the mines. The altitude at which the miners work makes 
it necessary to breathe deeply, and 'When the air is saturated with tin 
dust, this deep breathing invariably leads to silicosis. 
Here is an eye-witness account of the conditions under which 
the miners have to work, by Foster Hailey of The New York Times, 'Who 
visited the mines in June 1951:**' 
At the working face of the Pulacayo silver and lead mine 
in the Bolivian Department of Potosi the ore-breaking rock is 
so hot that it numbs the hand. Indians clad only in a G-string 
and rubber boots hack at the precious rook Whose metals mean 
so mu.ch to today•s industrial world. The temperature varies 
from 120 to 125 degrees. The humidity is 90 to 95 per cent. 
Rock dust fills the air and the lungs. Carbon dioxide bubbles 
from the freezing water that drips from the ceiling and runs 
do'Wll. both sides of the tonnel. 
For eight hours a day, or longer, six days a week, 3,000 
to 4,000 men, women and children ranging in age from 10 to 35 
labor at cutting out the ore, hauling it to the surface and 
sorting it out for shipment to the world's smelters. For this 
they reaeive wages that reach a peak, for the men, at 135 
bolivianos a day. (The boliviano at aurrent quotations is a-
bout 200 to $1.) These miners are the highest paid workers 
in Bolivia. 
"When the .day's work is done they leave the sweltering 
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heat of the mine shafts and tunnels for unheated homes of 
unmortared stone. Outside in the clear, rare atmosphere 
of 15,000 feet altitude the temperature ranges from the low 
50 1 s in the day to below freezing at night. Their meals 
are scant and lacking in vitamins, for all food has to be 
imported and the cost is high. Clothing also is costly and 
only a minimum can be bought. Fuel is used for cooking, 
not for the heating of water or for bathing, or for heating. 
Sixty per cent of the miners, it is estimated, have 
tuberculosis. Half are syphilitic •• half the babies born 
die in the first year. Those who live have a life expec-
tancy of 35. That is only about half what it is in the 
United States. Medical attention is scanty and few survive 
either a bad injury or major illness. 
The intense heat of 'Which the above article speaks, is the 
result of the lack of ventilation in many of the tunnels of the mines. 
In contrast, there are also mines in which the cold is so acute that 
the men must work at a feverish pace in order to keep warm. 
The work in the mines besides being difficult, is also dan-
gerous.* In this respect, the mine-owners have failed completely to 
live up to their responsibilities. Recent inspections by various 
Missions of the United·Nations have indicated an almost total lack of 
safety devices and sanitary facilities. This may account for the fact 
that about 20 per cent of the miners are incapacitated permanently or 
temporarily from injuries every year, not to speak of the 8 to 9 per 
cent incapacitated by occupational lung ailments.** 
E. Coca, A Scourge or a Blessing 
A description of the·tin miners of Bolivia and their way of 
life would not be complete without a few words about coca, or cuca as 
pronounced by the. natives, alse kno-wn as 11 erytb.roxylum. coca, 11 the di-
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vine plant11 of the Incas, or the green gold of the Yungas. To say that 
coca has been a controversial subject is to understate the question. 
Coca has been cursed, and it has been praised. Periodically, earnest 
reformers have initiated campaigns to stamp out its use, but with little 
apparent success. These would-be reformers have been mainly sc:Lentists 
and doctors, who felt that the coca habit has been responsible for the 
degeneration of the Indians; and that as long a:s indulgence in coca re-
mains unmitigated, improvement in their conditions will be impossible.* 
On the other side of the argument are those who take the tra-
ditional attitude, probably the greatest majorit,r. Their thesis seems 
to be, that without coca the Bolivian Indian could not endure the rigor-
ous climate nor the difficult working conditions in the mines.** Many 
of those sharing the latter view do so because they may have a vested 
interest in the profits der!ved from the marketing of the coca leaves. 
The government, too, has from time to time tried to curb the extensive 
use of coca, but the efforts have, for the most part, been in vain. A 
petent reason for its failure may be,tb.e f~ct that the government der-
ives considerable revenue from the tax on the sale of coca. 
It is estimated that the annual consumption of coca leaves 
in Bolivia amounts to well over 5,000 tons.*** What is more signifi-
cant, this huge consumption has remained static since the beginning of 
the present century. Very little coca is exported; i.n all probability 
because local consumption is sufficient to absorb most of the Bolivian 
output. 
*15, p. 249 
**17, P• 175 
***17, P• 175 
1. Historical and Re]jgious Significance 
There is no way of knowing how far back in history coca -was 
used, but it must have been in use at the beginning of the Christian 
era inasmuch as pouches of coca leaves have been found on the Pacific 
coast in the early tombs of that period. 
Coca, in Inca times, was regarded with religious nwstery and 
reverence. The leaves were used qy the Inca wise men as sacred incense 
during their religious ceremonies.* They were offered as a sacrifice 
to their gods. The coca leaves were used to a great extent as plasters 
for application on wounds and they were taken internally as a medicine. 
Historians say that in Inca days, coca was not as abundant as it is to-
day, and aside from its use as a medicinal and religious object, was 
eaten only by the Inca and his relatives. 
2. Coca Habit Universal Amo;gg Indians 
~ Today, the use of coca is universal among the Aymara and 
Que'chua Indians.it* The habit is developed at a very early age, and is 
connnon with both men:'tand women. In chewing the coca, the leaves are 
plaaed in the mouth together with a little alkaline paste made from the 
ashes of quinoa stalks. This paste sti.mu.la tea the extraation of the 
alkaloids from the coca.. The mixture is formed into a ball which :i,s 
' kept in the cheek and to which fresh leaves are added periodically dur-
ing an interval of from 8 to 10 hours. The mastication of coca leaves 
is, in a way, similar to the chewing of tobacco. But there the paral-
lel ends because, to the Bolivian highlands• Indian, the chewing of 
*15, p. 238· 
**15, P• 247. 
coca is not a lu:x:u.ry, but a daily necessity. He may not have enough to 
eat, but he will always have his pouch of coca leaves.*' 
3. Cocaine Content of Coca 
It is controversial how much cocaine the masticator of coca 
leaves derives from his daily intake. Estimates vary from an infinitesi-
mal amount to 30 centigrammes. Some scientists actually discredit the 
toxic effects of coca, and instead claim for it a high nutritional and 
vitamin value.** 
Coca, as used by the In~ian seems to calm and fortify his 
system.*** Its main effect appears to be to temporarily paralyse the 
appetite while satisfying the stomach. It is said that with three or 
four lumps of coca as his only food, the Indian will be inured to do 
work that would make a white·man succumb, especially in the high alti-
tudes. 
It shou1L.d be borne in mind that the Indian mine laborer is 
not altogether problematical. Many of those who have oppressed him and 
used him for their own financial gain have called him stupid, indolent, 
thriftless, obstinate, and many other deprecating terms. They attribute 
his sull.enness and pis ignorance to degeneration caused by centuries of 
the use of coca. They forget that he has qualities that have made his 
services indispensable. Other people "Who have mown him well maintain 
that the Indian is docile, courteous, frugal, enduring, that be fears 
neither heat nor cold, that he is indifferent to atmospheric variations, 
*l7, p~ l74. 
**l5, p. 249 
***l7, p. l74 
that he is indefatigable as a bearer of burdens, and finally, that in 
high altitudes he is a source of labor that is hard to replace. 
F. Capital for the Tin Mines 
Up until October 31, 1952, the date of nationalization, the 
Bolivian tin· industry had been developed by private companies and fo-
reign capital, the greater part American.* Most of the tin production 
came from three large mining interests, namely, the Patiiio, Hochschild, 
and Aramayo companies, 'Whose combil:aed production accounted for about 
80 per cent of the total Bolivian output. These three groups dominated 
such a large part of the Bolivian economy that it has been said: "Pa-
tiiio o'W!ls half of Bolivia, Hochsohild half of the other half, and Ara-
mayo half of the remainder. n** The three "tin barons" have long been 
the object of hate of the Bolivian masses. They have been described 
as belonging to a class of greedy exploiters who were ~terested in 
"raking in" the money while their workers died like vermin in the mines. 
1. SimOn I. Pati.iio*** 
The stery of Simon I. Pa tilio can most accurately be described 
as the "rags to riches" fable t1J:l'D.ed into reality. Patillo, a Cholo and 
lewly store clerk, at. the turn. of the century acquired a small tin mine 
in payment for a debt, worked the mine with his o'W!l hands, and by skill-
ful manipulatien and shrewd bargaining worked himself to the position of 
"tin kingll of the world, and to an estimated fortune of one billion 
dollars.**** Patillo died in 1947, but during the latter part of his 
*85, p. 34· 
H6o, p. 84· 
~1, P• 74. 
****108, P• .34. 
life he lived like an emperor, marrying his son Antenor into royalty 
and his daughters into French and Spanish nobility. He had himself' 
made Bolivian minister to France in order to avoid having to pay in-
come taxes, although his annual income surpassed that of the Bolivian 
government. He built palaces costing millions of dollars, and 'Whenever 
he was in New York, he would rent an entire floor at the Waldorf-Astoria. 
2. Mauricio Hechschild* 
The second of the tin magnates, and a German-born Jew, Mauricio 
Hochschild is regarded as being the shrewdest and the most hated of the 
three. The fact that he is Jewish and foreign 'Born, has no doubt been 
utilized by anti-democratic elements interested in fomenting anti-Semi-
tism and anti-Amerioanism in Bolivia. · 
It is reperted reliably that Hochschild, aware of the scarcity 
of labor and for the need of immigration,** in 1939, headed a plan for 
the immigration of 4,800 Jewish refugees 'Which were to be settled in the 
thinly populated areas of the department of Santa Cruz. However, the 
Jewish immigrants who actually reached Bolivia between 1939 and 1942, 
settled almost entirely in the large cities where there was already a 
problem of population, and 'Where they became retailers, lenders, hotel 
managers, jewelers, and small manufacturers.*** 
As was to be ex:peoted, the settling of the Jewish immigrants 
in the cities and tows rather than in the undeveloped agricultural 
areas of Santa Oruz and Cochabamba created a negative and often hostile 
attitude among m0st Bolivian citizens. The rise in the cost of living 
*60, p. 85. 
**8, P• 229. 
***8, P• 229. 
was .. in a large measure attributed directly to the absorption of certain 
branches of retail trade by refugees. Another contentian of the Boli-
_vians was that the housing shortage was also due to the influx of the 
refugees into the large cities. And finally, there was a fear gene-
rated that certain branches of small manufacturing would eventually pass 
into the control of immigrants, to the detriment of the national eoonoli\Y• 
This unsuccessful immigration venture on the part of Hoohschild 
served only to augment the hostility which he has inspired in the Boli-
vian people. In l943 he was arrested by the government and condemned to 
die for his allegt?d. sins against the Bolivian pe0ple. But the success-
ful overthrow of the Villarroel Government saved his life. 
In all fairness to Hochschild, it is said that he has been a 
real evangelist for Bolivian tin. Realizing the complexities of Boli-
vian tin concentrates, he has attempted to solve the dilemna of its pro-
duction through new techniques and machinery. He has travelled arlen-
sively in Europe and in North America promoting the construction of 
smelters for low grade tin ore. It is claimed that it was largely · 
through his persuasion that the United States Government agreed to build 
the Texas Longhorn Tin Smelter.* 
, 
3. Victor Carlos _ ~amayo** 
, 
Very little has been written about Carlos Victor Aramayo, the 
\ 
least important of the triumvirate of the 11tin barons.n He is known as 
a Bolivian blueblood, as an ex-Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 
and as owner and publisher of Bolivia t s once leading newspaper, La Raz6n. 
*6o, P• '87. 
**6l, P• 74. 
There is evidence to believe that Aramayo's newspaper has been very in-
fluential in the past, in fashioning governments• policies "With the tin 
mine ow.ners' interests at heart.* Paz Estenssoro, the incumbent presi-
dent has termed the newspaper, 11the enemy of the people .. u The Compagnie 
Aramayo de Mines accounts for approximately lO per cent of total tin 
production and its oapital was of Mss and .American origin. 
4. Medium and Small Minesz 
Twenty medium sized companies and 2,500 small operators pro-
duce the remaining 20 per cent of Bolivian tin.** It is in these smaller 
mines that working condi tiona are said to be at their worst. As in the 
larger mines, an almost complete absence of safety devices, and venti-
lation make the death rate of accidents, silicosis, and tuberculosis 
incredibly high. It is said that on the average of 7 ,ooo workers are 
incapaci~ted every year. 
G. Mining and Smelting of Tin in Bslivia 
Mining methods range from crude pick and shovel techniques in 
the smaller mines to complex and specialized machinery in the larger 
ones. It must be remembered that in Bolivia, tin miners deal with pro-
blems that are more difficult to solve than those of the other tin 
miners of the world. The ore, aside from being in the remote fastness 
of the mountains, is a complex ore, a refractory type requiring ela-
borate processes for smelting, even for reducing it to the concentrates 
which are shipped to the smelter. Both hand-operated and mechanized 
mills must make a rich concentrate from low grade ore, sometimes refer-
*86, P• 916. 
**134, p. 72. 
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red to as ·••dirty ore .n* As expected, the mechanized mills manage to 
produce concentrates with less impurities than b,y the hand-operated me-
thods. But even after the milling process, the supposedly rich con-
centrates which are Shipped to the smelters are said to consist of 65 
per cent useless rook. 
The obvious solution to this shipping of useless rock would 
be to smelt the concentrates in Bolivia. However, smelting in Bolivia 
has never been financially successful. The ore must be mixed with the 
purer alluvial tin of Malaya, and no on~ has considered it economically 
practicable to bring Malayan ore to Bolivia for this purpose. More-
over, as has been noted, no coal or other fuels are available. There 
is, however, ample potential hydro-electric power Which would facili-
tate electric smelting, which, in turn, has been declared suited to 
Bolivian ores. In vie'W of this, a few attempts have been made to set 
up hydro-electric smelters but they have not been financially practi-
cable. 
At the time of this writing, Bolivia, finding herself vi thout 
buyers of her ore concentrates, as one of the consequences of the na-
tionalization of her tin mines and high prices has announced an agree-
ment with an Argentine financial group for the construction of a smel-
ter in Bolivia whioh will produce 99.9 per cent tin metal.** 
H. Tin in the Econoli\Y 
The importance of tin to Bolivia cannot be over-emphasized. 
It is indeed her financial mahtspring. Ever since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, minerals have accounted for more than SO per cent 
*90, P• 30. 
l___~ __"*~02, p. Z70. 
TABLE II 
Table Showing Relative Importance 
of Metal Exports to Bolivian 
EconOlJIY 
(Official Dollar Value) 
% of Total 
Represented 
Year All Exports Metals Other Exports by Metals 
1938 27,393,064 24,975,761 2,41-7,303 91.1S% 
1939 33,$45,578 31,574,139 2,271,439 93.29% 
1940 49,828,880 4'7 ,830,036 1,998,844 95.99% 
1941 60,649,705 57,985,162 2,666,543 95.60% 
1942 65,656,822 63,158,453 2,496,359 96.19% 
1943 81,6,00,563 77,809,652 3,740,911 95·42% 
1944 77,553,779 72,545,001 4,988,778 93.67% 
1945 80,431,630 74,787,823 5,644,008 92.9&t 
1946 73,650,220 67,190,003 6,459,227 91.23% 
1947 81,268,639 78,683,628 3,185,011 96.08% 
1948 112,768,462 110,856,752 1,911,710 98.30% 
'fetal 746,64'7,342 7o6,945,199 37,702,143 94·94% 
Seurce: Memoria Anual del Banco Central, 1948. 
of the total value of the country• a exports. Today, minerals Dlake up 95 
per cent of her exports, and since tin comprises 75 per cent of the min-
erals, it is the most important exchange earner.* Tin is responsible 
for maintaining a relatively dense population on the barren Altiplano. 
Bolivia's railroads were built primarily for the purpose of hauling the 
tin ore from the mines to the coast. Taxes on tin exports have been the 
source of 60 per cent .of the nation's revenues. All other industries, 
and all other activities have been more or less sublimated to the pro-
duction of tin. 
Needless to say, this almost total dependence upon tin has 
created an unbalanced and unstable economy. The financial prosperity of 
the country and the stability of the government have been tied to the 
prices of tin in world markets. This 'WRS particularly true before the 
institution of the International Tin Cartel in 1931. Before that period 
fluctuations in the price of tin were so great that in 1918, 125,000 
tons were worth $200,000 while in 1930, 170,000 tons were only worth 
$120,000. Annual fluctuatiE>ns seldom were less than $200. a ton, and in 
the disastrous 1920 1s the prices of tin had a range, from high to low of 
$1,000 a ton.** 
Moreover, Bolivia's competitive position has been greatly en-
dangered in recent years mainly because most of her high grade ores have 
been exhausted, and because the leading tin-min1ng countries are pro-
ducing tin much more profitably than is Bolivia. Furthermore, in a 
country where a presiden~ salary is only $3,600 a year,***.# the m1n1ng 
#See Table III. 
*134, P• 11 
**60, P• 74 
***140, P• 9 
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companies have found it easy to curry favor w.i. th the ever-changing 
governments. Because their primary interest has been to get large and 
quick returns f'rom the mining of tin, they have caused the various 
governments to forget their proper responsibility of adequately devel-
oping the country• s bountiful resources. Furthermore, and incredible 
as it may seem in view of their parasitical dependence upon the mining 
industry, the governments have inexcusably neglected to allot an ade-
quate portion of the national budget to the Department of Mines and 
Petroleum to enable this organization to carry on systematic prospect-
ing, and to otherwise promote mining activities.* 
As a result of this shortsightedness of past leaders, the 
present administration finds itself totally in the dark w.i. th regard to 
information concerning r~ining mineral reserves. To appreciate the 
gravity of this situation it must be remembered that all economies de-
pendent on extractive minerals are basically transitional. That is, 
there is a definite limit to the mjning of minerals within a specific 
region, as evidenced by the numerous ughost11 mining towns. It is true 
that systematic conservation may extend the life of a mine or oil well, 
but it cannot replace the deposit after it has been removed. 
Lacking a diversified economy, Bolivia is left completely at 
the mercy of her minjng industry, and should her mineral resources be 
exhausted or become economically unrecoverable, most of her important 
cities, deprived of their means of livelihood and reliant upon food 
imports for their subsistence, would be evacuated en masse. Her rail-
roads would be rendered useless since the mining region affords no 
-TABLE III 
Selected Annual Salaries in Private and Public 
Employment in Bolivia 
President of the Republic. 
1949 - 1950 
(U.S. Dollars) 
• • • • • .3,600 
General Manager of a large mining corporation. • 18,000 
Cabinet Minister • • • • • • 
Mine Superintendent • • • • 
Director of General Customs • • • • • 
Works Manager of an average-sized manufacturing concern • 
Secretary to a cabinet minister • • 
Secretary to the manager of a large private concern 
Government clerk • • 0 • 
Business clerk • .• • • 
Source: Report of the United Nations Mission of Techni-
cal Assistance to Bolivia. United Nations, New York, 
1951, P• 9. 
1,440 
5,100 
1,260 
.3,600 
384 
540 
198 
'12 
other means of support to Bolivians. 
There is no doubt that Bolivia's situation 'Will be sad indeed, 
if her tin ores run out before she has a chance to develop her other 
natural resources. Her present rich and productive Altiplano could 
very well become a huge "ghost" area. 
V. Bolivia and the United States 
A. Intr<Dducti«>n 
It has been noted previously that Latin Americans on the 
'Whole look with skepticism and aynicism upon idealistic statements of 
United States foreign policy. Our neighbors have read that the United 
States is the lighthouse of democracy and a stanch believer in the 
principles of laissez-faire. They have heard about the Four Freedoms, 
but remember the many violations of the policy of non-intervention in 
another country's internal political affairs 'Which the United States 
has connnitted under the Monroe Doctrine concept.# They remember the 
ruthless exploitation which has characterized a few American investors. 
They have heard popular leaders branded as fascists or communists be-
cause dictators Qr exploiters find it expedient to discredit them. More-
over, they are acutely conscious of direct or indirect interventions of 
the United States in their economic affairs, interference which has in-
variably favored business interests even when these seemed clearly Qp-
posed to any reasonable standards of the general welfare.* 
In the pages that follow the writer will point out that such 
intervention on the part of the United States is nowhere more conspicu-
ous than it is in Bolivia. Attention will be focused on two major in-
cidents: The Catavi Mine Massacre of 1942; and the Revolution of 1951. 
It is the opinion of the writer that the actions of our State 
Department may have played an important part in helping to precipitate 
#For a descriptian of specific interventions see s. G. Inman, UTb.e MoB-
roe Doctrine and Hispanic America", Hispanic American Historical Re-
view IV, no. 4, November 1921, PP• 635-637. 
*19, P• 722. 
the fateful mine riot. He believes also that the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, PV causing the deterioration of Bolivian econo~ through 
its tin-buying strike, may indirectly have helped bring about the 1951 
revolution led by Paz Estenssoro. At any rate, an effort will be made 
to record the facts as accurately as possible, so that the reader may 
be able to establish his own criterion. In order to properly view these 
two incidents, historical perspective is desirable. We shall take the 
end of the Chaco War in 1935 as our point of departure. 
B. The Post-Chaco War Period 
' As has been noted,; the Chaco War decimated Bolivia • s Indian 
population and intensified her grinding poverty. It reduced her na-
tional territory to a little more than one-half of the domain originally 
bequeathed by Simon Bolivar. The war precipitated an inflation spiral 
which raised the cost of living to several times the level of 1931. The 
belief that Bolivia was in the clutches of foreign imperialists who 
were draining her wealth began to spread from the intellectuals to the 
wor~ class. 
It was natural that this germinating social up;b,eavel of the 
Bolivian masses should bring to the fore a popular leader and war hero 
like Colonel German Busch. Busch took over the reins of the Government 
in a bloodless ooup d'etat on .Tuly 13, 1937. Although he began with a 
relatively conserv~tive policy, he changed his ideas drastically in 
April, 1939, "When he initiated a program "to end the rule of financial 
privilege and extremist tendencies which had introduced the worst chaos 
in the history of Bolivia. u* A deQree -was issued ordering the mining 
*13, P• 655. 
---- ·-
companies to turn over to the government all their earn:i.Dgs of foreign 
exchange from tin exports, and to accept in return, their equivalent in 
domestic currency. Presumably, this meant that all profits which had 
previously been taken out of Bolivia would now have to be kept in the 
country. 
This bold move on the part of Busch made him a hero in the 
eyes of most of the Bolivian people, However, being an economic illite-
rate, Busch did not know what to do next. At that time the only large 
tin smelters were located in England. Consequently, it was necessary 
that Bolivian tin concentrates go to England. But the English smelters 
were controlled by the International Tin Committee, ~ich controlled 
Bolivia's tin mines as well as the rest of the leading tin-producing 
mines of the world. With 11tin king" flatiiio at the top of the interlock-
ing corporations, Busch found himself unable to enforce his decree. If 
he attempted to enforce it, Patino would stop production in Bolivia, 
which would materially decrease Patillo's income but not eliminate it 
entirely, since his income from smelting operations alone presumably 
was considerable. 
On the other hand if Busch expropriated the mines, he would 
find himself without a market to sell the ores, and without revenues 
from tin, the government would be unable to survive. Ironically, Busch 
found himself trapped by the very popularity of his decree. Unable to 
enforce it, he could not withdraw i~, for if he did, the people would 
turn against him. 
It seemed that the only solution was to build a smelter in 
Bolivia. The country, however, lacked the necessary capital, and se 
Busch sent representatives to New York to try to arrange a loan. These 
attempts proved fruitless since private bankers are not likely to lend 
money to a government attempting such radical reforms. Busch, a young 
visionary type found himself without a workable solution to multiple 
problems. But despite the gradual worsening of economic and political 
conditions, President Busch continued his program of increased govern-
ment control. He announced a program which included expropriation of 
Standard Oil, a simplified tax on tin mining, the creation of a "buffern 
stock of tin, maintenance of the currency at a stable rate of exchange, 
and a planned economw Which would co-ordinate nproduction, circulation, 
and consumption of wealth to lower the cost of living and raise living 
standards. n* 
Busch was never able to put his program into effect, for on 
August 23, 1939, he was found dead of pistol wounds.**An official inves-
tigation reported "that he had committed suicide. 11 However, considering 
what was at stake, and the previous history of violence in Bolivian 
polities,*** an assumption of foul play is equally reasonable. At any 
rate, the government reverted back to the hirelings of the mine o'WD.ers, 
and immediately discarded Busch's ambitious program of reform. 
C. The Catavi Mine Massacre 
On December 21, 1942, soldiers stationed at Simon I. Patiiio•s 
Catavi mine machine-gunned and shelled with trench mortars eight thou-
sand men, women, and children, who had struck the day before demanding 
*18, p. 486. 
*il-13, P• 655. 
-***64, P• 443. 
a 100 per cent increase in pay and better working conditions,* and who 
had gathered en masse at the mine entrance to protest the company's re-
taliatory closing of the pulperias.# Curiously, The New York Times re-
ported the incident as a riot on the part of the miners Who were endan-
gering the tin supply of the United Nations with their work stoppage 
and demands for a 100 per cent increase in pay.** No reference was 
made to the fact that the average minerts daily -wage at that time was 
less than 50 cents, nor of the fact that living costs had risen eleven 
hundred per cent. The average reader of the New York Times would im-
mediately have condemned the mine workers for their seemingly unreason-
able demands. 
President Enrique Penaranda Valdivieso•s# government proceed-
ed to brand the workers' strike as Nazi-inspired. It announced the 
casualties at Catavi as 19 killed and 40 wounded, a figure contradicted 
several months later by Martin C. Kyne, CIO labor leader and member of 
the Magruder Labor Commission, w.ho reported that at least 400 mine 
workers were buried that day.*** Whatever the real number, President 
Penaranda promptly declared a state of siege, and at the same time or-
dered the miners back to work. 
#Company stores, used indirectly to control labor. No food is issued 
if the miner is not at work. When a strike is called, the companies 
close the stores. Since the mines are generally isolated and com-
petitive stores do not exist, miners find themselves unable to get 
food. 
#General Penaranda elected president April 15, 1940. 
*36, P• 202. 
**105, P• 2. 
***36' p. 202 
TABLE IV 
Cost of Living Index for La Paz* 
(1937 ~ 100) 
Year Year 
1937 • • • 100 1944 • • 450 
1938 • • 134 1945 • • • 484 
1939 • • 188 1946 • • 562 
1940 • • 220 1947 • • • 652 
1941 • • 298 1?48 • • 684 
1942 • • • • 385 1949 • , • 768 
1943 • • • 417 1950 • • • 850 
*The de facto capital of Bolivia 
Source: 
/ 
Boletin, Banco Central de Bolivia. 
The who1e affair probably would have been forgotten quickly 
had it not been for a 1etter written to Under-secretary of State Sumner 
We11es by Ernesto Ga1arza, an American citizen of Mexican birth and 
Chief of the Division of Labor of the Pan-American Union.* In the 
1etter, Ga1arza accused our own State Department of putting pressure on 
President Penaranda to prevent passage by the Bolivian Congress of a 
Labor Code designed to better the working conditions of the miners. 
Because this 1etter was 1ater proved to be firmly founded on 
incontestab1e facts, the writer considers it essential to reproduce part 
of it here:** 
Mr. Sumner Welles 
Under-Secretary of State 
Sir: 
The dec1aration of a state of siege in the Republic of 
Bolivia last week brings to a head a fundamental issue w:Lth 
regard to the policy of the State Department teward the peo-
ple of Latin America 'Which can no 1onger be ignored. I ad-
dress this letter to you because the formulation and applica-
tion of this policy has been mainly in your hands during the 
past 8 years. 
The state of siege declared in Bo1ivia, in J'li3'" judgment, 
is a result of popular resentment against certain practices 
of Corporations, especial1y in the mining industry, toward 
the workers. It is a1so the result of mass discGmtent a.moun-
tin almost to despair because of rapidly increasing living 
costs and the scarcity of basic foods. 
You are a-ware that for many years, the Bolivian workers 
have sought relief from a condition which kept 90 per cent 
or more of the people of that country in a state of chronic 
misery and economic degradation by seeking the enactment of 
a labor code which would open lega1 avenues for the improve-
ment of conditions. The code drafted three years ago was 
being revised by the Bolivian congress and was to have been 
*107, P• 40. 
**'19, P• 59. 
.,., 
enacted by December 8th of this year. The nature of this 
code is indicated by the fact that through its operation the 
Bolivian workers hoped to obtain wages on time, the right of 
collective bargaining, minimum wages, and the strengthening 
of mediation and arbitration. · 
I have received information to the effect that While 
the new labor code was under discussion, the American Am-
bassador to Bolivia, Mr. Pierre Boal, communicated to Presi-
dent of Boll via, General Enrique Penaranda, the views of the 
American Embassy with regard to the bill then pending before 
Congress. 
In these conversations Boal did not venture to give in-
structions to President Penaranda but it is clear that the 
Ambassador's observations were intended to diminish the pro-
spects of passage of the labor code. The Ambassador clearly 
agreed with the position of the large mine operators that 
the new code would impose disagreeable administrative expen-
ses on the companies; that it was desirable not to pay wages 
on time in order to compel workers to remain on the job; 
that the enactment of the code would compel the companies to 
demand higher prices from the United States Government for 
tin and other essential materials; that collective barg~ining 
would be detrimental rather than helpful to production.U 
In effect, Galarza's letter accused Pierre De-Lagarde Boal of 
directly supporting the mine interests against the Bolivian workers. 
The letter caused severe reverberations. Several prominent labor lea-
ders demanded Senate investigations of Boal's activities.* Hull, Welles 
and Boal denied that there had been any interference by the State De-
partment in Bolivian affairs.** Galarza subsequently resigned from his 
position at the Pan-American Union, and at the same time asked for a 
public hearing. 
Again, it appears probable that the issue would have been for-
gotten had it not been for I. F. Stone, Washington correspondent for 
#See Appendix B. 
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The Nation, who managed somehow to acquire the complete official cable 
correspondence exchanged between Ambassador Boal and the Secretary of 
State. Excerpts from this cable correspondence were printed in The 
Nation and furnished irrefutable and incriminating evidence that Ambas-
sador Boal had, in fact, acted in a questionable manner. Boal probably 
asked President Penaranda to veto the code if the Congress should pass 
it, because in his cable to the Secretary of State, Boal reported that 
the president of Bolivia had expressed the opinion that he could not 
veto the code without provoking strikes and labor agitation. Instead, 
the president had suggested that inasmuch as the code was provisional, 
it would be within his power to suspend those clauses most likely, from 
the point of view of the mine owners and the American Embassy, to have 
an adverse effect.* 
Boal specifically mentioned Article 53 of the Code, which he 
termed an inconvenience since it required the payment of wages every 
fifteen days. The Ambassador obj acted to the article on the grounds 
that it would increase bookkeeping costs, and would encourage the 
workers to quit on pay day. Boal' s actual words were: 11They are now 
paid tardily deliberately in order to maintain them on the job and give 
them a stake in their next month r s pay." 
The Secretary of State's reply to Boal•s cable was as follows:~ 
It is, however, desirable that you discreetly express to 
the President or other appropriate authorities your government's 
hope and confidence that no steps will be taken 'Which might 
result in the creation of a situation which would inhibit the 
*79' 'fl. 4.3. 
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full performance of contracts made in good faith by both 
parties. 
You may refer to the fact that the agencies of the 
government have entered into important contracts for the 
purchase of various strategic materials, particularly tin, 
tungsten, antimony, and rubber. It is, of' course, patent 
that the uninterrupted flow of these items is essential to 
the optimum prosecution of' the war. It is. consequently 
hoped that no action will be taken which might jeopardize 
hemispheric security. Discreet reference can be made to 
Resolution IV of the Rio meeting on the production of' 
strategic materials. 
Strangely enough, the printing of the above communication 
provoked no official or unofficial denials from the State Department.* 
There apparently were no attempts to discredit Stone's story and no 
effort was made to publish the official texts of the Boal cable or of 
Hullls reply. There was, instead, a feverish attempt to uncover the 
source from which The Nation had obtained the incriminating evidence. 
It must be clarified that despite Mr. Boal's opposition, the 
Bolivian Congress passed the labor code anyway. In turn, President 
Peiia.randa promptly suspended the rights which the code recognized, and 
when the miners struck in protest at Catavi a few days later, he did 
not hesitate to resort to the brutal measures to which reference has 
been made. 
This then was the manner in which a local labor problem grew 
to the proportions of an international incident. The reaction which it 
caused throughout La tin America was so great, that it led to the forma-
tion of a Joint Bolivian-United States Labor Commission, which under-
took to investigate the working conditions of the Bolivian mines.** This 
*'79, p. 4.3· 
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Commission, the American m~bers of which were named b.1 the State De-
partment, conducted its inquiry during February and the first half of 
March 194.3.* 
The Commission~ report signed at La Paz, on March 14, gener-
ally substantiated Ernesto Galarza's vivid description of the plight of 
the Bolivian mine workers. It appears that the Commission's investiga-
tion was of little or no concrete value. For one thing, the usefulness 
of the American members of the Commission had been definitely limited 
b.1 the instructions 'Which they had received in advance to turn in a un-
animous report.** Consequently, 'When the Bolivian m~bers ventured to 
suggest "that the solution of the social problems of the miners depend-
ed primarily on a sound economic basis11 which they felt could be brought 
about automatically through better prices for Bolivia's raw materials, 
the American m~bers, although they may have been inclined to agree, 
could but subscribe to an addendum of their Report 'Which stated: 
The American members of the Joint Commission were in-
structed by the Government of the United States not to deal 
with the question of the adequacy of present mineral or rub-
ber prices nor to make any recommendations for revision of 
contracts. If such had been our responsibility, the personnel 
of our group would have been quite differently constituted. 
We therefore made no study of these matters, 'Which are appro-
priate for consideration b.1 other agencies of our government. 
The above interpretation of this episode in the history of our 
commercial policies, like all value-judgments, is open to challenge. 
The challenger may argue that our country was at war, and therefore, not 
in a normal situation. He may argue that our leaders felt it their 
*Sl, p. 10. 
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responsibility to see that our strategic material sources were not 
jeopardized, and that our Secretary of State and our Ambassador acted 
according to the judicious dictates of their positions and their re-
sponsibilities. 
It should be the aim of every humane policy in times of na-
tional peril to retain the maximum concern for human rights and dignity 
as will permit the state itself to survive the onslaught of its enemies. 
Judgment in such a case as this depends on the reader's decision as to 
whether or not this was done. 
D. Outline of Period 1943 - 1951 
Since this study is not concerned directly with events follow-
ing the Catavi Mine incident, they will be referred to briefly so as te 
proceed to the next important event in Bolivia's history in which, the 
writer believes, the United States played a definite role. 
In December 1943,* almost exactly a year to the day of the 
Catavi Mine Massacre, the PeM.randa government Wa.s swept out of office 
in a coup d•etat led b,r Victor Paz Estenssoro, a th~y-six year old 
economics professor and head of the political party known as the Movi-
miento Nacionalista Revolucionario,# a party identified with the Fede-
ration of Mine Workers and the working groups.** Estenssoro, rather 
than assume the presidency himself, named Chaco War hero Major Gualberto 
Villarroel, chief executive. 
President Villarroel immediately initiated a program similar 
in content and objectives to that of German Busch. Like Busch, his op-
#The National Revolutionary Movement or MNR. 
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TABLE V 
Table Sho-wing Bolivian Miners r Daily Wage 
Prevailing in November 1950 
(u.s. Currency) 
Number of Workers 
Range Percentage 
Men Women Total 
Under .20 cents 46 40 ~ 0.,32 
.21 to .40 654 550 1,204 4.52 
.4l to .60 1,9.32 244 2,176 8.17 
.61 to .80 2,~82 .319 2,901 10.89 
.81 to 1.00 .3,547 141 .3,688 1.3.85 
1.01 t0 1.20 .3,501 ll4 .3,615 1.3.57 
1.2:1.. to 1.40 5,970 ll6 6,086 22.85 
1.4l to 1.60 .3,105 66 .3,171 ll.91 
1.61 tCl> 1.80 887 7 894 ,3.,36 
1.81 to 2.00 252 0 252 0.95 
2.01 to 2.20 82 0 82 0.,31 
2.21 to and up 696 0 696 . 2.61 
Unkown.'Wages 1.702 79 1,781 6.69 
Totals 24,956 1,&76 26,6.32 100.00 
SOURCE: Ricardo Anaya, Nacionalizacion de las Mines de 
Bolivia. Imprenta Universita.ria, Cochaba.mbamba, Bolivia, 
1952, p. 9.3· 
position to the mine-awning interests made his almost two and one-half 
years incumbency a most uneasy one. Then on July 21, 1946, the pattern 
of violence -was traced again on the streets of La Paz, and another ad-
ministration ended in blood and disaster with the assassination of 
Villarroel, 'Whose body was hung on a lamppost in the plaza of La Paz.* 
The government was taken over by a cabinet whose members had all been 
managerial policy-making employees of the "tin barons. n** 
With the return of rule by the "Rosca, n# the end of 'World 'War 
II, and with increasing competition from the rehabila ted tin mines of 
Indonesia and Malaya, social and economic conditions went from bad to 
worse in Bolivia. The administra tiona of Monje Gutierrez, Hertzog, and 
Urriolagoitia, all of them more or less subservient to the mine inter-
eats, were faced with perplexing economic problems on the one hand, and 
increasing general discontent and unrest on the other. ill these fac-
tors added materially to the explosive revolt of April 1951, but the blow 
par excellence to the Bolivian people, in the opinion of many, was dealt 
by the tin-buying strike, in 1951, by the United States Government. 
E. Tin-Buying Strike by the United States 
On April 4, 1951, tin dramatically left the relative obscurity 
of the financial page for a prominent position on the front page. On 
that day, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas indignantly charged on the 
floor of the United Sta tea Senate that the American taxpayer was being 
"gouged" by an alleged world tin cartel. Senator Johnson's exact words 
were:*** 
#Literally, "The Twist" it is comprised of the mine owners, their hire-
lings, big landowners, generals, and church hierarchy. 
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The American taxpayer is weary of being gouged for the 
privilege of obtaining, from some of its Allies, the raw ma-
terials with which he is expected to supply the food and the 
armament needs of the non-communist nations in the event of 
another all-out -war. And this committee intends to do 'What 
it can do te put an end to that gouging. If we cannot obtain 
tin at reasonable prices, we must seriously reconsider our 
policies with respect to this metal. The battle against in-
flatien is also part of the fight against communism. For 
years producers have sought to hold down the production of 
tin in order to push up the prices. 
Senator Johnson's vociferous protest was the result of an 
investigation conducted by a Senate sub-committee into the meteoric 
rise of the price of tin from a pre-Korean 77 cents to a high of $1.93 
a pound.* 
The Senators went on to accuse Great Britain, Holland, Bel-
gium, and Bolivia of participating in a world cartel so as to push up 
the price of tin and thereby ••gougelf the American taxpayer. 
Needless to say, the Committee's charge aroused immediate and 
widespread indignation and resentment, not only among the American peo-
ple, but also throughout the chief tin-producing countries. 
Bolivia was the first producing nation to voice an objection.** 
A spokesman fElr her tin industry denied that his country belonged to a 
cartel. This statement was reiterated by Bolivian Ambassador Martinez 
Vargas, who said, "If any cartel exists we are not a part of it and our 
government does not know about it. 11*** 
On March 7, the General Service Administration announced that 
it had stopped buying tin for stockpiling purposes.**** B.1 March 10, 
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the prioe had plummeted to $1.34 a pound. 
On Maroh 8, a British statement generally approved the move 
taken by the United Sta tea. It weloomed the prioe drop but firmly de-
nied the "gouging" oharge made by Senator Johnson. The sharp rise in 
tin prioes 'WB.S seen not so nmch the result of profiteering and speou-
lating as of United States stockpiling and purchasing methods. liThe 
United States had been incautious and over-enthusiastic, and so the 
price had gone sky high."* 
And indeed, that is exa.otly what had happened. At the out-
break of the Korean "police action," the memory of World War II short-
ages -was fresh. The entire nation, producers and consumers alike went 
on a buying spree, so to speak. Inventories were depleted. Demand 
overran supply at current prices and the inevitable result -was higher 
prices for everything. 
It -was the same thing in the case of tin. Before the Korean 
'War, the United States was already oonsuming a little over half of the 
world's oonsum.ption. Had we used part of the tin alloted to consumer 
goods for stockpiling or armament needs, the demand for tin probably 
would not have gotten out of bounds. But producers wanted to keep using 
tin for consumer goods, in addition to an inoreased armament and stock-
piling demand. That was too muoh for the tin market to bear.** 
Reaction from Britain 'With regard to our tin-buying strike 
was eloquently expressed b.Y Londoner George Sohwartz in a note printed 
in Barrons. *** 
*122, P• 43. 
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Mr. Schwartz reaffirmed his appreciation of American genero-
sity in international affairs during the postwar period, but took ex-
caption to the Senate Committee's "irresponsible" charges of ttgouging.u 
Mr. Schwartz noted that American politicians are often inclined to en-
ter into economic affairs naively and with no previous study of the is-
sues involved. He pointed out that high tin prices were basically 
caused by our lthand over fist" stockpiling, and by demand expressing it-
self through the price mechanism. He reminded us that if we were not 
ready to accept the open price system, Socialists were always ready to 
provide us rl th a planned econom;r. 
Moreover, Schwartz added that instead of setting a low ceil-
ing price for tin, we should allow it to seek its own level. In the 
meantime, tin suppliers would be earning badly-needed dollars, and they 
in turn through multilateral trade, would be passing them on to other 
dollar-scarce countries, thus putting the emphasis on trade and elimi-
nating the need for gifts and grants.# 
Shortly after the United States announced its decision to 
stop buying tin, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with 'W. Stuart 
Symington as Administrator, was named the sole buyer and distributor of 
tin for the country.* Mr. Symington subsequently made it clear to the 
producers that he would not consider paying more than $1.03 a po~~­
Sylll.ington felt confident that he could drive the price 
#See Appendix c .. 
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since he knew that tin production had been exceeding demand since 1947. 
He also knew that because the United States was the world's largest con-
sumer, its withdrawal from the market would result in a glut.* 
Symington turned out to be right in this respect. The price 
for tin on June 1, was $1..36, by June 18, the price had dropped to $l.o6~~ 
The 11fly in the ointmenttt was Bolivia. For the further the price drop-
ped the more vehement grew the Bolivian protests to the State Department. 
While Symington had correctly calCUlated that the Malayans and the Indo-
nesians could not long resist his flat offer, he apparently had not oon-
sidered Bolivia, Whose tin production costs are considerably higher than 
those of the Dutch East Indies. 
The Bolivians argued, with reason, that they had, in fact, ex-
changed a tin monopoly for a tin monopsony. They stated that the Boli-
vian econo~ was undergoing serious deterioration owing to the abrupt 
shook from complete cessation of her tin exports.*** They reminded the 
State Department that shortly before Korea, Bolivian representatives, 
concerned about falling prices, had gone to Washington and offered the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation a long-te~ contract at what the,y 
considered a reasonable price. But the RFC had flatly refused on the 
grounds that the fundamental principles of the United States were based 
on the laws of supply and demand.. Then the Korean crisis came and the 
prices of tin had soared, and the fo~er champions of the free market 
had arbitrarily closed the free market in the United States. 
*6.3, P• 68. 
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Here are the Bolivian arguments submitted to S,ymington:* 
1. Bolivia as the world's second greatest producer of tin 
concentrate ores was the chief source of tin for the 
Allies 'When Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies fell 
under Japanese control. Thus, this source should be 
protected b.1 the United States. 
2. As the result of war production also, great sources of 
Bolivian high grade ore were devoured, leaving lower 
grade ores with increasingly higher mining costs. 
3. The rise in tin prices has not been comparable from 1939 
to 1951 with the rise in other metals. The percentage 
of increases in those years for lead, zinc, copper and 
antimony combined have been 445 per cent while the in-
crease in tin in those years has been 123 per cent. 
4. Production costs of lead, zinc, copper and antimony re-
flect changes in labor, production, materials, etc. By 
comparison with other metals, tin should be $1.6782 per 
pound, thus justifying the Bolivian demand of $1.50. 
5. Bolivia is in a disadvantageous -oompetitive position with 
such areas as Malaya. 'Whereas Malayan tin is dra-wn from 
river beds and transported b,y boat, Bolivia mnst dig for 
the ore and use railroads for transportation. Further-
more, Bolivia mnst pay in dollars for railroads, power 
and taxes 'While Malaya fills its needs from Britain in 
devalued pounds sterling. 
Despite all these arguments, Symington refused to consider 
the Bolivian price of $1.50 per pound, and instead offered $1.12.** 
Bolivia refused.*** 
Early in January of 1952, there were hints from Bolivia that 
steps might be taken to invoke the economic aggression clause under 
Article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.**** 
These reports disturbed the State Department considerably since it 
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knew that any injury to Bolivian tin would fan the flame of anti-Am-
ericanism in the other monocultural or monoproduction Latin American 
countries. Consequently, Secretary Acheson informed Mr. Symington of 
the decline in the prestige of the United States in Latin America, 
and urged him to review the tin policy of the RFC. * 
Mr. Symington resigned as RFO Administrator January 15, 1952, ~"* 
but his name is still anathema in Bolivia where he is kno'WD. as the '!'an-
kee Devil."*** 
Symington's departure from the RFO did not materially a1 ter 
that agency's policy with respect to the purchase of tin. It still re-
fused to buy the metal at other than the RFO price. Moreover, the se-
rious depletion of industrial stocks caused by the strike was consider-
ably alleviated by the British-American exchange effected on January 
18, which gave the United States the right to purchase 20,000 tons of 
Malayan tin at $1.18 a pound. As a consequence of this agreement, the 
bargaining position of the RFO was very much improved. 
In the meantime, conditions in Bolivia were steadily worsen-
ing and the National Revolutionary Movement had made the best of the 
situation. There was a series of labor strikes, riots and mass demon-
strations. President Hugo Ballivian desperately charged the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation with imperiling his regime and the Boli-
vian economy.**** 
The March 1952 issue of the Atlantic reviewed the Bolivia-
RFO tin deadlock in the fallowing manner:***** 
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Unless the price dead-lock can be broken, Bolivia 
faces agghastly economic crackup, and all the political and 
social chaos which in underdeveloped countries goes with it. 
This situation has arisen because the U~ted States 
policy toward the only tin reserve area in the world which 
is 'Wholly safe from the Russians, and to-ward an extremely 
touchy political and economic problem as well, has persis-
ted in an adament "business as usual11 attitude. 
In April, two days before Easter and the bloodiest Bolivian 
revolution to date, Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico assailed what 
he called lithe stupid and disastrous" United States policy in the price 
deadlock with the Bolivian tin producers .. * His remarks -warned that a 
grave crisis -was eminent in Bolivia. It is doubtful that he realized 
the accuracy of his prophecy at that time. 
The Easter Sunday revolution brought back into power Victor 
Paz Estenssoro, the economics professor who had deposed the Penaranda 
regime in 1943. 
Estenssoro represents the extreme in nationalism. He ran for 
president on a party platform which stood for nationalization of the 
mine industry, for anti-Americanism, anti-mine owners, anti-lando-wners, 
and pro-Bolivians. 
On April 19, 195.2, Business Week ran an article entitled 
"Bolivian Revolt, Did u.s. Blunder? 11 This writer respectfully submits 
the same query to the reader. 
*29, P• 158. 
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VI. Conclusion 
A. Revolution and Crisis 
It is not the purpose of this study to evaluate the latest 
Bolivian revolution. Some believe that it is just another palace re-
volt rl th one clique replacing another. Others call it the first ge-
nuine revolution that Bolivia ever had. 
'Whichever point of view is correct, the alarming fact is, 
that many Bolivians and other Latin Americans firmly believe that the 
United States not only might have forestalled this latest debacle, but 
that it wilfully invited it.* They claim that "United States' insensi-
tivity to the feelings of Latin Americans, the harsh postwar policies 
she has directed toward the south, have helped to create a dangerous 
anti-capitalist situation.u** The Latin Americans admit that part of 
the blame for the attitude of the United States can be attributed to 
the problems of the cold war in the other parts of the world. This, 
however, does not satisfy them, for they claim that during World War II 
they were promised aid 'Which they have not received.*** Furthermore, it 
does not make them any happier to realize that the United States ex-
pediently courts them or forgets them as it suits its purpose. 
The writer does not wholeheartedly support these contentions. 
Latin Americans have only themselves to blame for a great many of their 
woes. In many cases they have been betrayed by leaders too weak to re-
sist their o'W!l avarice and selfish ambitions. But, as this study has 
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attempted to point out, we have often grossly neglected our responsi-
bility in Latin America, deliberately or otherwise. 
At the time of this writing, Bolivia finds herself in an al-
most insolvable crisis. 'When Paz Estenssoro nationalized the mines on 
October 31, 1952, without adequate plans for their indemnification, he 
immediately alienated the American stockholders of the Patino Mines 
and Enterprises Consolidated, Inc., as well as the Patifio controlled 
smelters in England. The Bolivian President has expressed a desire to 
recompense the ousted mine o'Wllers.* But unfortunately, a strong coali-
tion within his O'Wll party, led by the Minister of Mines and Petroleum, 
,. 
Juan Lechin, is strongly opposed against any kind of indemnity.'** This 
group claims that the mine o'Wil.ers owe the country about 500 million 
dollars in back taxes and retroactive pay to the mine workers. 
The mine owners, on the other hand, demand 60 million dollars 
as adequate compensation and will not accept less.*** They have refused 
to negotiate with the government on a tentative figure of $22 million, 
strategically preferring to wait until the inability to make tin sales, 
either through unofficial boycotting or through the United Statest re-
fusal to buy, forces the almost bankrupt regime out of power. 
It can hardly be questioned that the crisis in Bolivia pre-
sents a serious problem to the United States. In order to make his na-
tionalization program a success, Paz Estenssoro needs foreign technicians 
to operate the mines, investment capital to develop other resources and, 
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above all, a long term tin contract with the United States. As things 
stand now, it seems unlikely that the United States Government is in a 
position to help Bolivia. To do so would be to condone the expropria-
tion, thereb,y setting a dangerous precedent which could ultimately 
threaten United States and other foreign investors in the rest of Latin 
America, particularly the oil and copper investments in Venezuela and 
Chile, respectively. 
At the same time, the Unite~ States faces the grim reality 
that Bolivia is the only important source of tin outside of Southeast 
Asia. Should this area fall to the Communists, the United States would 
be completely dependent upon the Bolivian mines, and there is no ques-
tion but that grave danger exi~ts that these mines may be abandoned, 
thereb,y ending their usefulness as a source of this vital metal. 
Moreover, if we stand by and indifferently watch another san-
guinary revolt take place as a result of economic collapse, American 
prestige in Latin America, already seriously eroded, would be irrepara-
ply damaged. Of greater danger is the fact that Bolivian doors will be 
wide open to conummi sm. This danger is not an imaginary one. Connnun-
ists there have been actively sowing the seeds of discontent and hate. 
It is reported that disguised Communist agents infiltrate the mines and 
preach the complete extermination of the whites and of the propertied 
class.* They agitate the mine workers into demanding absolute control 
of the mines, an all-labor cabinet in the government and, worst of all, 
a complete break in relations with the United States. 
*llO, P• 50. 
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B. Recommenda. tions 
After viewing the dismal and unsavory picture of the si tua-
tion in Bolivia, the reader may ask, llcan anything be done about it?" 
The -writer sincerely believes that something can be done not 
only in Bolivia and Latin America, but throughout the entire world. 
It must be realized that it is impossible for the United 
States as the greatest commercial power in the world to contain her-
self within her domestic boundaries. Higher interest rates and earnings 
abroad will inevitably be attractive to the large savings of a country 
which is already highly capitalized. And Latin America with its accele-
rated population growth and vast undeveloped and untapped resources, 
provides what could be an ideal and unlimited outlet. However, an en-
tirely different policy from that which has prevailed in the past will 
have to be adopted. Heretofore, investors, for the most part, have 
been interested onl:y in the raw materials which they could obtain from 
the area. And since the raw materials were generally of an extractive 
nature, they attracted the type of investor 'Who was not concerned with 
public interest. As a result, few or no profits were ploughed back in-
to the area of exploitation, and many of those regions today have an 
anachronistic appearance appropriate to the sixteenth or seventeenth 
centuries. Investors will have to encourage social and economic develop-
ment while realizing that such reforms will raise the level of their 
living and, in turn, give these former serfs and peasants greater pur-
chasing power, thus enhancing the investor's future potential. 
With this in mind, the author submits the following sugges-
tions to help bring about a better, wiser, and more understanding in-
~· 
vestment policy. These ideas are admittedly not original. They have 
_been advanced before, but the author believes they bear repetition. 
Of course, investment is a two-way street, and both investors 
and areas of investments have definite obligations and responsibilities 
which should not be ignored. However, lack of time and space make it in-
advisable to deal with specific recommendations to foreign countries. 
These suggestions apply only to American investors abroad. 
First of all, the taxation system in the United States should 
be modified in order to make foreign investment more attractive tG Am-
erican capital. This could be done by making profits earned outside the 
United States tax-free unless and until those profits were brought back 
into the country to stay. This would encourage investors to reinvest 
profits in the country where they were earned. 
Secondly, in order to avoid intervention or entanglements in 
another country's political affairs, there should be some sort of invest-
ment insurance plan which could be operated by the Export-Import bank 
in cooperation with the State Department, that would protect the ~vestor 
. -~:-_---~ ---:---::;;;--......._____ ' 
against revolution or other hazards which the American ilfv~~~tU-d · _:_,~~ ~~·- ~- :~ ---:-;~~ ~ ~ .. 
not be likely to encounter in the United States. Thi~'j.:risurance: pla.ri.-<" 
.... ~ ~ - -
would effectively nullify the need for our State Dept£{ment te :!p.terv~ne 
~~ = "'- : 
..,. ~<' ...,..._ --..;,;. ; 
in behalf of the American investor. ~'--·¢~· · ~ ., 
',.__ 7 ~!'~.~ :: . .: ~-:,·;_-~.\-< 
Third, the American investor should encourage' ·loc~~ ~~t.icipa-
tion to the greatest possible extent. He should endeavor to identify 
his corporatican or project with the public interest of the country, 
just as the American domestic corporation tries to identify itself with 
the public interest. If he employs American citizens, he should select 
_, 
them with extreme care to see that they are sympathetic and understand-
ing to the citizens of the foreign country. A superior attitude on the 
part of the American citizen will just fan the fire of nationalism in 
the foreign peoples. 
Fourth, the American foreign investor must participate active-
ly in educating his fellow-countrymen to buy more from abroad. The 
United States has reached the status of a creditor nation and must be-
have like one. A consistent program of net foreign investment requires 
other countries to sell more to us than we sell to them so that we can 
collect the proceeds of our investments abroad. It is true that elimi-
nating tariffs and other restrictionist devices will cause some domestic 
industries to suffer from increased competition. However, the govern-
ment can and should be prepared to ease the readjustment by direct sub-
sidies or other appropriate means. At any rate, if the United States 
does not allow other countries to earn dollars by buying their goods, 
future net foreign investment will be in the form of involuntary gifts. 
And last, but not least, the author believes that the increa-
sing importance of Latin America warrants the appointment of a govern-
ment official of full cabinet status whose sole duty would be to deal 
rl th that area and its relations with the United States. Undoubtedly, 
there would be those who would challenge this suggestion. It would be 
wise for the challengers to remember that if the "cold warn should 
ever develop into a llhot" one, we shall need all the friends and allies 
we can muster. 
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Appendix A 
Excerpt from the Nicolaus Loan Contract 
Article IV, Section 2 
The Republic hereby affects and encumbers with a first lien or pledge 
and charge in favor of the Trustee the following shares of stock, funds, 
revenues and taxes as security for the full payment of the principal, 
premium and interest of the Bonds, and of all other expenses and a-
mounts required for or incident to this contract or to the service of 
the Loan, to wit: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
(j) 
(k) 
(1) 
All of the shares, not less than 114,000 of the Banco de la 
Nacion Boliviana, belonging to the Republic and which the 
Republic represents are sufficient at present to control 
said Bank... In case the capital stock of the Banco de la 
Nacion Boliviana should be increased at any time during the 
life of this Loan, the Republic shall acquire such propor-
tion of the additional shares as may be necessary to main-
tain the said control; the shares so acquired shall imme-
diately thereafter be pledged as security for this Loan; 
All revenues representing dividends payable upon said shares 
during the life of this Loan; 
The tax upon mining claims or concessions; 
The revenues received by the Republic from the alcohol mono-
poly; 
90 percent of revenues received by the Republic from the to-
bacco monopoly; 
The tax on corporations other than mining and banking; 
The tax upon the net income of banks; 
The tax on interest on mortgage cedulas; 
The tax on the net profits of mining companies; 
All import duties; 
Surcharge on import duties; 
All export duties •••• 
Section 4. UAs further security hereunder, the Republic hereby consti-
tutes first mortgages and liens upon all the properties and earnings of 
the railroads constructed and to be constructed from Villazon to Atocha 
and from Potosi to Sucre, including their franchises, concessions, e-
quipment and other appurtenances, and upon the net income of said rail-
roads after deducting the expenses of operation ••• 
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Appendix B 
A Letter to Sumner Welles 
Mr. Sumner Welles 
Under Secretary of State 
Sir: 
' 
The declaration of a state of si~ge in the Republic of Bolivia 
last week brings to a head a fundamental issue with regard to the po-
licy of the State Department toward the people of Latin America which 
can no longer be ignored. I address this letter to you because the 
formulation and application of this policy has been mainly in your 
hands during the past 8 years. 
The state of siege declared in Bolivia, in my judgment, is a re-
sult of popular resentment against certain practices of Corporations, 
especially in the mining industry, toward the workers. It is also the 
result of mass discontent amounting almost to despair because of ra-
pidly increasing living costs and the scarcity of basic foods. 
You are aware that for many years, the Bolivian workers have 
sought relief from a condition which kept 90 per cent or more of the 
people of that country in a state of chronic misery and economic de-
gradation by seeking the enactment of a. labor code which would open 
legal avenues for the improvement of conditions. The code drafted 
three years ago was being revised by the Bolivian Congress and was to 
have been enacted by December 8 of this year. The nature of this code 
is indicated by the fact that through its operation the Bolivian wor-
kers hoped to obtain wages on time, the right of collective bargaining, 
minimum wages, and the strengthening of mediation and arbitration. 
I have received information to the effect that while the new la-
bor code was under discussion, the American Ambassador to Bolivia, Mr. 
Pierre Boal, communicated to President of Bolivia, General Enrique 
Peiiaranda, the views of the American Embassy with regard to the bill 
then pending before Congress. 
In these conversations Boal did not venture to give instructions 
to President Penara.nda but it is clear that the Ambassador's observa-
tions were intended to diminish the prospects of passage of the labor 
code. The Ambassador clearly agreed with the position of the large mine 
operators that the new code would impose disagreeable administrative 
expenses on the companies; that it was desirable not to pay wages on 
time in order to compel workers to remain on the job; that the enactment 
of the code would comp§:t the companies to demand higher prices from the 
United States Government for tin and other essential materials; that 
collective bargaining would be detrimental rather than helpful to produc-
tion. 
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I believe that democracy and production must go up or dorm. to-
gether. The contrary is the thesis of totalitarianism. For this rea-
son I am prepared to state that the attitude and the point of view re-
presented b.r Ambassador Boal will lead to a further decline of produc-
tion in Bolivia and in other parts of Latin America as well. The phy-
sical reserves of the Latin American workers, especially in the vital 
industries, are already so low that the systematic opposition to better 
housing, higher wages, adequate medical attention, efficient training, 
collective bargaining, and proper representation, before public admini-
strative bodies will drive the workers to adopt every form of active and 
passive resistance. In my judgment they will be justified in so doing. 
The war production in Latin America involves fundamental questions 
of physical well-being, of morale, of effective use of all the physical 
and technical resources of the Americas. I submit that the policy of 
Ambassador Boal has made it impossible to attack some of the questions 
through the use of agencies of the United States and through the use of 
means and methods in behalf of the connnon welfare which many La tin Am-
erican governments have already tested and applied. It is also my 
deeply held conviction that as long as the present policy continues, the 
economic development of Latin America through industrialization wherever 
possible, the stabilization of Latin American economy through agricultu-
ral progress and other measures which have been amp~ discussed in inter-
American conferences will not be attained. 
Iffeel impelled to dissent vigorously from the present policy of 
this government in Bolivia for another reason. Statements have been 
made in the press and on the radio in this country to the effect that 
the strikes in Bolivia are caused by Nazi agents. 'What is the result if 
we allow this interpretation to gain currency among the American people? 
First attention will be diverted from the real causes of unrest, namely, 
bad housing, lack of food, disease, and poverty. 
Second, it will be easier to label all dissenters as 11Nazis. 11 I 
assert that the Nazi agents are not causing something which has its 
roots in basic economic maladjustment. The Nazis are merely taking 
clever advantage of something which they hope to use to disoredi t demo-
eracy. 
This is attained by contrasting the public statements of President 
Roosevelt and vice-president Wallace with the every day practical and 
immediate effects of American policy in Latin American countries. There 
has been established in the minds of the Latin American people an iden-
tity, a oause and effect relationship, between the suppression of the 
right of free speech, the negation of the right of collective bargaining, 
the dispossession of small farmers, the freezing of wages, the soaring 
cost of living and the courageous doctrine of the Four Freedons enun-
ciated by the President of the United States, reiterated b.1 the vice-
president, and stressed by you in several important speeches in recent 
months. 
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In consequence, as an American citizen of Mexican birth; as one 
who is profoundly disturbed b.1 the increasing dislocation of produc-
tion of essential raw materials attributable directly to antiquated 
and narrow interests, as one Who believes that the Chief Executive of 
this government, the Congress of the United States, and the people of 
this country are entitled to decide Whether continental solidarity 
must be bought at the price being currently paid by the workers of 
Bolivia, for these reasons I protest formally against the conduct of 
Ambassador Beal. 
This protest is filed with you by me on DIY personal and indivi-
dual responsibility. My position as chief of the Division of Labor 
and Social Information of the Pan American Union does not in any way 
imply that my statement reflects any opinion except my own. 
'Washington,D.O. 
December Zl, 1942 
Ernesto Galarza 
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Appendix C 
A Note From London 
I have througho~t been openly appreciative of the U.S. genero-
sity in international affairs during the postwar period, and I have 
gone on record in arguing that possibly that generosity has been in 
excess. 
I take liberty, however, to bridle at the charge of ugougingn 
'Which was levied by one of the Senate Committees in respect of the 
price of tin. 
I note with melancholy satisfaction that the incursions of your 
politicians into economic issues are as unhappy as anywhere else in 
the world. 
These incursions frequently border on the naive, and in view of 
the fact that you have been stockpiling - very sensibly - hand over 
fist for the past 8 months or more, it is surely the height of naive-
ty for your representatives to raise an indignant voice at this juncture, 
~{hat's going on here/ Who's pushing the price? Name the chiselersJ 11 
Now the primary producers both inside and outside the U.s. are 
enjoying high prices at the moment •• Goodl Let them reap the benefits, 
advise them not to lose their heads, but don't nag them because the 
operation of demand and supply is expressing itself through the price 
mechanism. If you don't believe in the open price system, the Social-
ists are ready to provide you with a planned econonzy-. Your function 
is to bail out other people's planned economies, not to become one your-
self. 
You are now in the position to tell the rest of the world that if 
it wants dollars it can come and get them. The countries that cannot 
earn them directly can earn them through liilll tila teral trading with dol-
lar earners. With the high prices now prevailing, the primary producers 
can go all out in production; and if their expansion in output at this 
junction does spring down prices, in some degree, they can still earn 
handsomely. This is where you stop talking about grants and even loans 
and put the emphasis on work and output. 
I have a feeling, however, that you have become grant-conditioned. 
You would sooner beat down external suppliers to a low ceiling price 
and then make up the difference in gifts. You denounce the taxi-
driver's all-in offer as gouging, but promise to make it up with a tip;·. 
Make up your mind, 'Which beard to sport; Uncle Sam's or Santa Claus•. 
George Schwartz 
lo6 
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